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Abstract
Access control plays an important role in many information systems. Embedding
policy-based access control into modern encryption schemes is an interesting but
challenging task that has been intensively studied by the cryptographic research
community in recent years. Furthermore, most of encryption schemes require not
only the guarantee of security, but also the efficiency in terms of computational and
communication cost when producing ciphertext and secret key.
In this thesis, we study Functional Encryption comprising its subclasses such as
Attribute Based Encryption, Hidden Vector Encryption, and Inner Product Encryp-
tion. We boost the advantage of these encryption schemes by improving their perfor-
mance, which is critical for real applications. We also consider the user anonymity
in these encryption systems in order to protect user privacy, which is very important
nowadays.
This thesis has five major contributions. First, we construct two Attribute
Based Encryption schemes for achieving the constant ciphertext size and hidden
ciphertext policy. Second, by combining Attribute Based Encryption and Broad-
cast Encryption, we construct Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption schemes with
short ciphertext and short decryption key. Third, We also explore the anonymity
of Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption supporting multi-gate access structures.
Fourth, we propose two ciphertext policy hidden vector encryption schemes with
constant-size ciphertext, and attribute hiding. Both of our proposed schemes achieve
the efficiency and flexibility. Finally, we construct a new type of fuzzy public key en-
cryption, called Edit Distance-based Encryption, based on the Edit Distance which
is a very useful tool to measure the similarity between two strings.
In our constructions, we define the access policy by applying the Boolean AND
Gates Access Structure with positive, negative attributes including wildcard; OR-
AND Gates with positive, negative attributes. We also develop techniques to bridge
Attribute Based Encryption, Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption with Inner
Product Encryption, and then use the latter to achieve the goal of hidden access
policy. All of our proposed schemes are proven secure under standard assumptions.
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Traditional public key encryption establishes a secure public channel, in which the
public key is generated by a party as an encryption key; anyone who knows that
public key can use it to encrypt messages and create the corresponding ciphertexts.
The private key is used by the party who knows it to recover the original message
from any ciphertexts generated using the matching public key. Although the secu-
rity guarantee can be achieved in rigorousness as indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks, the notion of public key encryption is in-
sufficient in many applications. For example, emerging applications such as access
control services often require to specify an access policy in the ciphertext, and only
individuals who satisfy the policy can decrypt. More generally, the decryptor may
be authorized to access a function of the plaintext. Unfortunately, the traditional
public key cryptography cannot tackle with such tasks.
As a new broad vision of public key encryption, functional encryption provides a
promising solution for many challenging security problems such as expressive access
control and searching on encrypted data with a strong combination of flexibility,
efficiency, and security.
Functional Encryption. The first functional encryption is the Fuzzy Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) from Sahai and Waters [SW05a]. In Fuzzy IBE schemes,
the receivers ability to decrypt is merely contingent on his knowledge of a private
key associated with an identity that matches a string chosen by the sender. In a
functional encryption scheme for functionality F (., .), an authority holding a mas-
ter secret key can generate a key skk that enables the computation of the function
F (k, .) on encrypted data. Then using skk the decryptor can compute F (k, x)
from an encryption of x. Intuitively, the security should guarantees that it cannot
learn anything more about x. One well-representative of functional encryption is
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE).
Attribute Based Encryption. It was introduced by Sahai and Waters [SW05a]
and extensively studied in recent years [GPSW06, BSW07, Wat11a, LW12]. ABE
provides a fine-grained access control of encrypted data. There are two types of
ABE called Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE)[BSW07], and Key-Policy ABE (KP-
ABE)[GPSW06]. Under the construction of CP-ABE [BSW07], a secret key is
associated to a user’s attributes, such as {“Student”, “Faculty : CS”, “Major :
Cryptography”}, and a ciphertext is associated to access policies by composing
multiple attributes through logical operators such as “AND”, “OR”, e.g., “Student”
∧ (“Birthday:1988” ∨“Faculty:CS”). If a decryptor wants to decrypt the message
successfully, the attributes embedded in the secret key must satisfy the access poli-
cies embedded in the ciphertext. In contrast to CP-ABE [BSW07], in a KP-ABE
scheme [GPSW06], an encryptor associates a set of attributes to the message during
the encryption. Each user is assigned an access structure which is usually defined as
an access tree over data attributes, i.e., interior nodes of the access tree are thresh-
old gates and leaf nodes are associated with attributes. User secret key is defined
to reflect the access structure so that the user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if and
only if the data attributes satisfy his access structure.
Predicate Encryption. As another special sub-class of function encryption sys-
tems, predicate encryption (PE) offers a mechanism that provides more fine-grained
control over access to encrypted data. In a PE scheme, secret keys SKf correspond
to predicates or boolean functions f in some class F , and a sender associates a
ciphertext with an index I in some set Σ. The decryption can be successful if and
only if f(I) = 1. There are three typical types of predicate encryption systems
including Anonymous Identity Based Encryption, Hidden Vector Encryption, and
Inner Product Encryption.
• Anonymous Identity Based Encryption. The functionality of Anony-
mous IBE [BCOP04a] is similar to IBE except that the string representing the
ciphertext identity is hidden and one can only determine it if they have the
corresponding private key.
• Hidden Vector Encryption. Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) schemes
[BW07, KSW08a, SLN+10, HHI+11] allow wildcards to appear in either the
encryption attribute vector associated with a ciphertext or the decryption
attribute vector associated with a user secret key. Similar to ABE schemes,
there are two kinds of HVE: Ciphertext Policy (CP-) HVE schemes and the
Key Policy (KP-) HVE schemes. The decryption will work if and only if the
2
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two vectors match. That is, for each position, the two vectors must have the
same letter (defined in an alphabet Σ) unless a wildcard symbol ‘?’ appears
in one of these two vectors at that position.
• Inner Product Encryption. As mentioned in [KSW08a], inner product is
considered to be the most important class F of predicates. The class F of
inner-product predicates is defined as follows: a ciphertext (and a private key)
is associated with a vector ~x (and ~y ), then the ciphertext can be decrypted by
the private key SK~y if and only if < ~x, ~y >= 0. The inner-product predicate
suffices to express a wide class of predicates including conjunctive normal
form/disjoint normal form (CNF/DNF) formulas and polynomial evaluations.
Furthermore, it can support the attribute-hiding property and can be also
extended to construct PE schemes supporting different types of predicates.
It is worth mentioning that there is another variant of public key encryption called
Broadcast Encryption (BE). This aims to guarantee the communication services
in broadcasting and exchanging information confidentially and efficiently. Berkovits,
Fiat and Naor [Ber91, FN93] firstly proposed the notion of Broadcast Encryption
(BE). In this setting, a center is allowed to broadcast a secret to any subset of
privileged users out of a universe of size n so that conjunctions of k users not in the
privileged set cannot learn the secret. The functional encryption schemes reviewed
above can naturally be used as broadcast encryption.
In order to be useful in real applications, the efficiency and flexibility of functional
encryption is a necessary requirement. For instance, in many ABE schemes, the
size of ciphertext will increase as long as the number of attributes increases. It is
desirable that even though the number of attributes increases, the size of ciphertext
remains constant. Another challenging problem is protect the user privacy in ABE
or Predicate Encryption schemes. This means that the user can decrypt the message
without knowing access policy or the predicate F .
This thesis focuses on designing the aforementioned types of functional encryption.
Our goal is to enhance the ABE, HVE, IPE schemes in terms of efficiency, security
and flexibility, so that they can be applicable in the real scenarios. We also investi-
gate the relationships among these types of functional encryption to construct new
schemes with stronger security. Beyond that, we also construct new predicate en-
cryption scheme by exploring a real measurement metric to instantiate the predicate.
Summary of my results
In this thesis, we present two new Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
3
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
(CP-ABE) schemes where the access policy is defined by AND-Gate with wildcard
in chapter 3. In the first scheme, we introduce a new technique to construct a
new CP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext size. We prove our first scheme is
secure under the standard Decisional Linear assumptions. In the second scheme,
we propose a new CP-ABE scheme with the property of hidden access policy by
extending the technique we used in the construction of our first scheme. We also
prove that our second scheme is secure under the standard Decisional Linear (DLIN)
and Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumptions.
Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE) scheme is established by a com-
bination of Attribute-based encryption and Broadcast encryption. We focus on the
efficiency of ABBE scheme in terms of the ciphertext size and the key size. We pro-
pose two schemes: Key Policy Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (KP-ABBE)
with short key size and Ciphertexts Policy Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
(CP-ABBE) with short ciphertext size. Both of proposed schemes are proved secure
under the n-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Exponent assumption.
We also aim to achieve the anonymity for ABBE scheme which is desirable
in the real applications. Toward this goal, we propose the Anonymous Attribute
Based Broadcast Encryption with Multi-Gate Access Structure. The first proposed
scheme supports AND gates with positive, negative attributes and wildcard. This
is an extension of the aforementioned ABBE scheme. The second proposed scheme
supports OR/AND gates with positive, and negative attributes. Specifically, we
show a way to bridge ABBE with Inner Product Encryption (IPE) in order to
achieve the goal of anonymity. We also prove that both schemes are secure under
the standard DLIN and DBDH assumptions.
Next, we introduce two constant size ciphertext policy hidden vector encryption
(CP-HVE) schemes. Our first scheme is constructed on composite order bilinear
groups, while the second one is built on bilinear groups with prime order. Both
schemes are proven secure in a selective security model which captures plaintext (or
payload) and attribute hiding. Our schemes are the first HVE constructions that
can achieve constant ciphertext size among all the existing HVE schemes.
Finally, a new type of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based
Encryption (EDE) is proposed. We provide a formal definition and security model
for EDE, and propose an EDE scheme that can securely evaluate the edit distance
between two strings embedded in the ciphertext and the secret key. We also show
an interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption
which is very useful in a broadcasting network.
Organization of This Thesis
In Chapter 2, we introduce our notations and review background materials nec-
4
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essary for understanding the remainder of this thesis. We next present two new
Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption schemes in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4, we present Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption with short ciphertext and de-
cryption key. The anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption with AND,
OR gates access structure is presented in Chapter 5. We introduce two constant
size ciphertext policy hidden vector encryption schemes in Chapter 6. A new type
of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based Encryption is presented





In this chapter, we cover the notations and definitions that will be used throughout
this thesis. Background materials on the topic of number theory, bilinear maps,
mathematical tools and other preliminaries will be presented. More details of theory
and mathematical proof can be found in the following book [KL14].
2.1 Miscellaneous Notations
In this thesis, we denote the security parameter by λ. By 1λ, we denote the string of n
ones. By r
R← Zp, we denote the value r is randomly selected from the finite field Zp.
Negligible success probability. A negligible function is one that is asymptotically
smaller than any inverse polynomial function.
Definition 1 A function f from the natural numbers to the non-negative real num-
bers is negligible if for every positive polynomial p there is an N such that for all
integers n > N it holds that f(n) < 1
p(n)
.
Computational Indistinguishability. We say that two distribution families Ω1(l)
and Ω2(l) are computationally indistinguishability if, for all Probabilistic Polynomial
Time (PPT) algorithm A:
|Prx∈Ω1(l)[A(x) = 1]− Prx∈Ω2(l)[A(x) = 1]| ≤ negl(l)
Statistical Indistinguishability. We say that two distribution families Ω1(l) and
Ω2(l) are statistical indistinguishability if,∑
X
|Prx∈Ω1(l)[x = z]− Prx∈Ω2(l)[x = z|] ≤ negl(l)
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2.2 Abstract Algebra
2.2.1 Groups
Let G be a set. A binary option ◦ on G is a function ◦(., .) that takes as input two
elements of G. If g, h ∈ G, then we write g ◦ h.
Definition 2 A group is a set G along with a binary option ◦ for which the following
conditions hold:
• Closure: For all g, h ∈ G, g ◦ h ∈ G.
• Existence of an identity: There exists an identity e ∈ G such that for all
g ∈ G, e ◦ g = g = g ◦ e.
• Existence of inverses: For all g ∈ G there exists an element h ∈ G such
that g ◦ h = e = h ◦ g. Such an h is called an inverse of g.
• Associativity: For all g1, g2, g3 ∈ G, (g1 ◦ g2) ◦ g3 = g1 ◦ (g2 ◦ g3). When G
has a finite number of elements, we say G is finite and let |G| denote the order
of the group. A group G with operation ◦ is ablelian if the following holds:
• Commutativity: For all g, h ∈ G, g ◦ h = h ◦ g.
Proposition 1 Let b,N be integers, with b ≤ 1 and N ≤ 1. Then b us invertible
modulo N if and only if gcd(b,N) = 1.
Lemma 1 Let G be a group and a, b, c ∈ G. If ac = bc, then a = b. In particular,
if ac = c then a is the identity of G.
Theorem 1 Let G be a finite group with m = |G|, the order of the group. Then for
any element g ∈ G, gm = 1. (1 denote to the identity of group G).
2.2.2 Isomorphisms
Two groups are isomorphic if they have the same underlying structure. From a
mathematical point of view, an isomophism of a group G provides an alternate,
but equivalent, way of thinking about G. From a computational perspective, an
isomorphism provides a different way to represent elements in G.
Definition 3 Let G,H be groups with respect to the operations ◦G, ◦H, respectively.
A function f : G→ H is an isomorphism from G to H if:
1. f is a bijection, and
2. all g1, g2 ∈ G, we have f(g1 ◦G g2) = f(g1) ◦H f(g2).
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2.2.3 Cyclic Groups and Generators
Let G be a finite group of order m. For arbitrary g ∈ G, consider the set
< g >
def
= {g0, g1, . . .}.
By Theorem 1, we have gm = 1. Let i ≤ m be the smallest positive integer for
which gi = 1. Then the above sequence repeats after i terms, and so
< g >= {g0, . . . , gi−1}.
We see that < g > contains at most i elements. In fact, it contains exactly i elements
since if gj = gk with 0 ≤ j < k < i then gk−j = 1 and 0 < k − j < i, contradicting
our choice of i as the smallest positive integer for which gi = 1.
Theorem 2 Let G be a finite group and g ∈ G. The order of g is the smallest
positive integer i with gi = 1.
Proposition 2 Let G be a finite group and g ∈ G an element of order i. Then for
any integer x, we have gx = g[x mod i].
Proposition 3 Let G be a finite group, and g ∈ G an element of order i. Then
gx = gy if and only if x = y mod i.
Corollary 1 If G is a group of prime order p, then G is cyclic. Furthermore, all
elements of G except the identity are generators of G.
Theorem 3 If p is prime then Z∗p is a cyclic group of order p− 1.
2.2.4 Field
Field consists of a set of elements and two operations defined between any two
elements in the set.
Definition 4 A field (F,⊕,⊗) consists of a set F and two operations: addition ⊕,
and multiplication ⊗, and satisfies the following properties.
• Addition Group. (F,⊕) is an Abelian group. The identity of group (F,⊕)
is 0F.
• Multiplication Group. Let F∗ = F−{0F} (F∗,⊗) is an Abelian group. The
identity of group (F∗,⊗) is 1F.
• Distributivity. For all g1, g2, g3 ∈ F, (g1 ⊕ g2)⊗ g3 = (g1 ⊗ g3)⊕ (g2 ⊗ g3).
8
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2.2.5 Bilinear Map on Prime Order Groups
A pairing is a bilinear map from a pair of group elements to an element of a different
group. Specifically, let G1,G2,GT be cyclic groups of order p. Let g1 and g2 be
generators of G1 and G2 respectively. A function e : G1 ×G2 → GT is said to be a
pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity : e(ua, vb) = e(ub, va) = e(u, v)ab for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a,b
∈ Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy : e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT , , where 1GT is the identity element in GT .
3. Efficient Computability: e(u, v) can be computed efficiently (that is, in poly-
nomial time) for all u ∈ G1and v ∈ G2
4. Unique Representation: All elements in G1,G2 and GT have unique binary
representation.
Galbraith et al. [GPS08] classify pairing into three types. Specifically, if G1 = G2
(or there exists efficiently computable isomorphism between the two groups), the
pairing e is classified as type 1. If G1 6= G2 and there is no efficiently computable
homomorphism from G1 to G2 but there exists an efficiently computable homomor-
phism ψ : G2 → G1, the pairing e is classified as type 2. Finally, if G1 6= G2 and
there are no efficiently computable homomorphisms between G1 and G2, the pairing
e belongs to type 3. Broadly speaking, type 1 is sometimes known as symmetric pair-
ing while type 2 and type 3 are known as asymmetric pairing. Typically, G1 and G2
are subgroups of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, G3 will be
a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a related finite field and the map e will be
derived from either the Weil [BF01a] or Tate pairing [BKMX06] on the elliptic curve.
2.2.6 Bilinear Map on Composite Order Groups
From [BGN05, Fre10], let p, q be two large prime numbers and n = pq. Let G,GT
be cyclic groups of order n, We say e : G × G → GT is bilinear map on composite
order groups if e satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity : e(ua, vb) = e(ub, va) = e(u, v)ab. for all u,v ∈ G and a,b ∈ Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy : e(g, g) 6= 1GT
Let Gp and Gq be two subgroups of G of order p and q, respectively. Then
G = Gp × Gq, GT = GT,p × GT,q. We use gp and gq to denote generators of Gp
and Gq, respectively. e(hp, hq) = 1 for all elements hp ∈ Gp and hq ∈ Gq since





qa, gpb) = e(g, g)pqab = 1 for a generator g of G.
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2.3 Complexity Assumptions
Discrete Logarithm Problem. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [BL96]
forms the basis in the security of many cryptosystems. We restrict ourselves to
DLP in cyclic group in this thesis.
The Discrete Logarithm Problem in G =< g > is defined as follows: On input
a tuple (g, Y ) ∈ G2 , output x such that Y = gx.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem. If we can solve DLP in G, we can also
solve the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) [DH76] problem although whether
the converse is true or not is still an open problem.
The CDH problem in G =< g > is defined as follows: On input a tuple
(g, gx, gy) ∈ G3, output gxy.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption. It is the decisional version of the CDH
problem. It was first formally introduced in [Bra93].
The DDH problem in G =< g > is defined as follows: On input a tuple
(g, gx, gy, gz) ∈ G4, decide if gz = gxy.
Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption. It was first introduced in [BBS04].
The Decisional Linear (DLIN) problem in G defined as follows: given a tuple
(g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) ∈ G6 × GT , decide whether T = gb(c+d) or Z in random in G.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the DLIN problem in G if
AdvDLINA (k) = Pr[A(1
k, g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) = 1|Z = gb(c+d)]
−Pr[A(1k, g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) = 1|Z = gr] ≤ ε,
where a, b, c, d, r ∈R Zp. We say that the DLIN assumptions holds in G if ε is negli-
gible for any PPT algorithm A.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman(DBDH) Assumption .It was introduced
by Boneh and Franklin [BF01a] in their Identity Based Encryption (IBE) scheme.
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem in G is defined as fol-
lows: given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, T ) ∈ G4 × GT , decide whether T = e(g, g)abc or
T = e(g, g)r where a, b, c, r are randomly selected from Zp. An algorithm A has
advantage ε in solving the DBDH problem in G if
AdvDBDHA (k) = Pr[A(1
k, g, ga, gb, gc, Z) = 1|Z = e(g, g)abc]
−Pr[A(1k, g, ga, gb, gc, Z) = 1|Z = gr] ≤ ε.
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We say that the DBDH assumptions holds in G if ε is negligible for any PPT algo-
rithm A.
Decision L-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) Assumption
The Decision L-BDHE problem was introduced by Boneh, Boyen, and Goh
[BBG05] to construct a hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme with constant
size ciphertext, and later used for a public key broadcast encryption scheme with
constant size transmission overhead [BGW05].
The problem is defined as follows: Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p, and
g, h two independent generators of G. Denote−→y g,α,L = (g1, g2, . . . , gL, gL+2, . . . , g2L) ∈
G2L−1 where gi = gα
i
for some unknown α ∈ Z∗p. We say that the L-BDHE assump-
tion holds in G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A
|Pr[A(g, h,−→y g,α,L, e(gL+1, h)) = 1]− Pr[A(g, h,−→y g,α,L, T ) = 1]| ≤ ε(k),
where the probability is over the random choive of g, h in G, the random choice
α ∈ Z∗p, the random choice T ∈ GT , and ε(k) is negligible in the security parameter
k.
Decisional L− composite Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (cBDHE) as-
sumption. The L- composite Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent has been used for






Z = (gp, gq, h, g
α




p , . . . , g
α2L
p ),
T = e(gp, h)
αL+1 , and R← GT,p.
We say that the decisional L − cBDHE assumption holds if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A
|Pr[A(Z, T ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z,R) = 1]| ≤ ε(k),
where ε(k) denotes an negligible function of k.
L-composite Decisional Diffie-Hellman (cDDH) assumption [BBG05]
Let gp
R←− Gp, gq, R1, R2, R3
R←− Gq, α, β
R←− Zn
Z = (gp, gq, g
α







T = gβpR3, and R← G.
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We say that the L−cDDH assumption holds if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A
|Pr[A(Z, T ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z,R) = 1]| ≤ ε(k),
where ε(k) denotes an negligible function of k.
Bilinear Subset Decision assumption (BSD) assumption. This assumption
was introduced by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW06].
Let gp ← Gp, gq ← Gq,
Z = (gp, gq),
T ← GT,p, and R← GT,p.
We say that the BSD assumption holds if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A
|Pr[A(Z, T ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z,R) = 1]| ≤ ε(k),
where ε(k) denotes an negligible function of k.
2.4 Access Structure
An access structure is used to define an access policy. We focus on two Boolean gates
access structures: the AND Gates Structure, and the OR/AND Gates Structure.
2.4.1 AND Gates with positive, negative attributes and wild-
card
Let U = {Att1, Att2, ..., AttL} be the universe of attributes in the system. Each at-
tribute Atti has two possible values: positive and negative. Let W = {Att1, Att2, ...,
AttL} be an AND-gates access policy with wildcards. A wildcard ‘*’ means “don’t
care” (i.e., both positive and negative attributes are accepted). We use the notation
S |= W to denote that the attribute list S of a user satisfies W .
For example, suppose U = {Att1 = CS, Att2 = EE, Att3 = Faculty, Att4 = Student}.
Alice is a student in the CS department; Bob is a faculty in the EE department;
Carol is a faculty holding a joint position in the EE and CS department. Their
attribute lists are illustrated in Table 2.2. The access structure W1 can be satisfied
by all the CS students, while W2 can be satisfied by all CS people.
12
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Table 2.1: List of attributes and policies
Attributes Att1 Att2 Att3 Att4
Description CS EE Faculty Student
Alice + − − +
Bob − + + −
Carol + + + −
W1 + − − +
W2 + − ∗ ∗
2.4.2 Arbitrary OR/AND Gates with positive and negative
attributes
Table 2.2: List of attributes and OR/AND policies
Attributes Att1 Att2 Att3 Att4 Att5 Att6
Description CS EE Professor F.Officer Student Tutor
W1 −W11 + − + − − −
W1 −W12 + − − − + +
W2 −W21 + − + − − −
W2 −W22 + − − + − −
W2 −W23 − + + − − −
W2 −W24 − + − + − −
Let W1 = ((ANDi∈{1,...,m}Ai)OR1(ANDi∈{1,...,m}Ai)OR2 . . .ORm−1(ANDi∈{1,...,m}Ai))
be the disjunctive normal form (DNF) and,
W2 = ((ORi∈{1,...,m}Ai)AND1(ORi∈{1,...,m}Ai)AND2 . . .ANDm−1(ORi∈{1,...,m}Ai))
the conjunctive normal form (CNF). Then W1,W2 in Table 2.2 can be expressed as:
W1 = ((Att1 AND Att3))︸ ︷︷ ︸
W11
OR (Att1 AND Att6 AND Att5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W12
)
which can be satisfied by CS Professor or CS Student and Tutor; and.
W2 = ((Att1 OR Att2)) AND (Att3 OR Att4))
13
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which can be satisfed by CS Prof or CS Faculty Officer or EE Prof or EE Faculty
Officer. Hence W2 can also be expressed as:
W2 = ((Att1 AND Att3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W21
OR (Att1 AND Att4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W22
OR (Att2 AND Att3))︸ ︷︷ ︸
W23
OR (Att2 AND Att4))︸ ︷︷ ︸
W24
.
When a user joins the system, the user is tagged with an attribute list defined
as S = {Ai}i∈{1,m} . Then S |= W1, if the set of attributes in S satisfy one of AND
literals in W1; or S |= W2, if the set of attributes in S satisfy all of OR literals in
W2.
2.5 Mathematical Tools
2.5.1 Polynomial and Roots
We consider a polynomial P has degree n:
P = anxn + an−1xn−1 + . . .+ a1x+ a0 (2.1)
Suppose that P is the set of polynomials n-degree. We create a vector ~v from the
Figure 2.1: Checking one root of P
coefficients of polynomial P :
~v = (an, an−1, . . . , a1, a0)
With the arbitrary value x, we create a vector as:
−→x = (x · x · · ·x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, x · · ·x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-1
, . . . , x, 1)
If (~v · −→x ) = 0, then x is a root of P .
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2.5.2 The Viète’s formulas
Consider two vectors −→v = (v1, v2, . . . , vL) and −→z = (z1, z2, . . . , zL). Vector v con-
tains both alphabets and wildcards, and vector z only contains alphabets. Let
J = {j1, . . . , jn} ⊂ {1, . . . , L} denote the positions of the wildcards in vector ←−v .
Then the following two statements are equal:



































To hide the computations, we choose random group elemen Hi and put vi, zi as
the exponents of group elements: Hvii , H
zi

















Using the consequence of Viète’s formula we can construct the coefficient ak in
(2.3) by: 
x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn = (−an−1an )
(x1x2 + x1x3 + . . .+ x1xn)





x1x2 . . . xn = (−1)n a0an
Equivalently, we can write:
∑
1≤i1<i2<···<ik≤n




for k = 1, 2, ..., n.
As example, Let J = {j1, j2, j3}, the polynomial is (x− j1)(x− j2)(x− j3), then:
a3 = 1
a2 = −(j1 + j2 + j3)
a1 = (j1j2 + j1j3 + j2j3)
a0 = −j1j2j3.
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2.6 Edit Distance Algorithm
2.6.1 Edit Distance
Consider a finite alphabet set A whose elements are used to construct strings. Let
ZI , ZD and ZS be finite sets of integers. Let the function I : A → ZI be the
insertion cost function, i.e., I(a) is the cost of inserting the element a ∈ A into a
given string. Similarly, define the deletion cost function as D : A → ZD so that
D(a) is the cost of deleting the element a ∈ A from a given string. Finally, define
the substitution cost function S : A × A → ZS so that for a, b ∈ A, S(a, b) is the
cost of replacing the element a by the element b in a given string.
Given two strings of length m and n, denoted by X ∈ Am and Y ∈ An re-
spectively, consider the sequence of insertion, deletion and substitution operations
needed to transform X into Y and the corresponding aggregate cost of the trans-
formation.
Definition 5 The edit distance between X and Y is defined as the minimum aggre-
gate cost of transforming X into Y .
The general definition of edit distance given above considers different weights for
different operations. In this chapter we will consider a simpler definition which is
given below.
Definition 6 For all a, b ∈ A, let I(a) = D(a) = 1, S(a, b) = 1 when a 6= b, and
S(a, a) = 0. Then, the edit distance is defined as the minimum number of insertion,
deletion and substitution operations required to convert X into Y .
2.6.2 Dynamic Programming for Edit Distance
Let X = X1X2...Xm ∈ Am and Y = Y1Y2...Yn ∈ An be two strings. We use M(i, j)
to denote the edit distance between the two sub strings X1X2...Xi and Y1Y2...Yj .
The problem of finding the edit distance between X and Y can be solved in O(mn)
time via dynamic programming [Gus97], which will be used in our scheme.








Then, the edit distance M(m,n) is defined by the following recurrence relation
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n: M(i, j) = min {M(i − 1, j) + D(Yj),M(i, j − 1) +
I(Xi),M(i− 1, j − 1) + S(Xi, Yj)}.
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2.7 Cryptography Tools
2.7.1 Public Key Encryption
We present the formal definition of public key encryption
Definition 7 A public-key encryption scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial
time algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
• The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs a pair of keys (public key, private key) (pk,sk). We assume for that
pk, sk each has length at least n, and that n can be determined from pk, sk.
• The encryption algorithm Enc takes input a public key pk and a message m from
some message space. It outputs a ciphertext c, we write it as c := Encpk(m).
• The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a private key sk and
a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m or a special symbol ⊥ denoting failure.
We write this as m := Decsk(c).
2.7.2 Security against Chosen Plaintext Attacks
Given a public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and an adversary A,
consider the following experiment:
• Init: The challenger runs Gen(1λ) to obtain keys pk, sk. Then the challenger
send to the adversary A the public key pk.
• Setup: Adversary A is given pk, and outputs a pair of equal-length messages
m0,m1 in the message space.
• Challenge: A uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c ←
Encpk(mb) is computed and given to A. We call c the challenge ciphertext.
• Guess: A outputs a bit b′. The output of the experiment 1 if b′ = b, and 0
otherwise. If b′ = b we say that A succeeds.
The advantage of A in this game is defined as AdvA(λ) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
2.7.3 Inner Product Encryption
Let Σ ∈ Zn be the set of vectors ~v of dimension n, and F be the class of predicates
involving inner-products over vectors (F = f~x|~x ∈ Σ such that f~x(~y)
= 1 iff < ~x, ~y >= 0). An inner-product encryption (IPE) scheme for the class of
predicates F consists of four algorithms as follows:
17
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• Setup(1λ, n) on input a security parameter 1λ and the vector length n =
poly(λ), the algorithm outputs a public key PK and a master secret key
MSK.
• Encrypt(M,PK,~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn)): on input a message M , the public key
PK, and a vector ~v ∈ Σn, it outputs a ciphertext CT .
• KeyGen(MSK,~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)): on input the master secret key MSK,
a vector ~x ∈ Σ, the algorithm outputs a secret key SK.
• Decrypt(CT, SK): on input a secret key SK (w.r.t. a vector ~x) and a cipher-
text CT (w.r.t. a vector ~v), if f~v(~x) = 1, the algorithm outputs a message M ;
otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
2.7.4 Security Model for IPE scheme
Following [KSW08a], we define the security, i.e., attribute-hiding property, of the
IPE scheme. The security is defined by the following game interacted between an
attacker A and a challenger C. We assume that (Σ,F) are given to both A and C
in advance.
• Init: A outputs two vectors ~x, ~y ∈ Σ.
• Setup: C runs Setup to obtain the public key PK and master secret key
MSK. A is given PK.
• Query Phase 1: A adaptively issues private key queries for any vectors
~v1, . . . , ~vn ∈ Σ , subject to the restriction that, ∀i, < ~vi, ~x >= 0 if and only if
< ~vi, ~y >= 0. C responds with SK~vi ← KeyGen(SK, ~vi).
• Challenge: A outputs two messages M0,M1 with equal length. If M0 6= M1,
then it is required that < ~v, ~y > 6= 0 6=< ~v, ~x > for any ~v appeared in
Query Phase 1. C flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, C returns
CT ← Encrypt(PK, ~x,M0) to A; otherwise, if b = 1, C returns CT ←
Encrypt(PK, ~y,M1) to A.
• Query Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeatedly, which is required that < ~v, ~y > 6=
0 6=< ~v, ~x > for any ~v if M0 6= M1.
• Guess:A outputs a guess bit b′ and succeeds if b′ = b.
The advantage of A in this game is defined as AdvA(λ) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Definition 8 We say that an IPE scheme is attribute-hiding if for all polynomial
time adversaries A, we have that Adv(A) is negligible.
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2.7.5 Broadcast Encryption
Let U denote the set of all user indices. A broadcast encryption scheme consists of
four algorithms:
• Setup(1λ) : The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ as input and
outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MSK.
• Encrypt(S,M, PK) : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M , a set of user index S ⊆ U , and outputs a
ciphertext CT .
• Key Generation(ID,MSK,PK): The key generation algorithm takes as
input the master key MSK, public parameters PK, a user index ID ∈ U ,
and outputs a private key SK.
• Decrypt(PK, CT , SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameters PK, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK, and outputs a
message M if ID ∈ S or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
2.7.6 Security Definition for Broadcast Encryption
We define the Selective IND-CPA security for Broadcast Encryption via the following
game.
• Init: The adversary commits to the challenge user indexes S∗.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives PK to the adver-
sary.
• Phase 1: The adversary queries for private keys with the user index ID such
that ID /∈ S∗.
• Challenge: The adversary submits messages M0,M1 to the challenger . The
challenger flips a random coin β and passes the ciphertext ct∗ = Encrypt(PK,Mβ,
S∗) to the adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess β′ of β.
Definition 9 We say that a Broadcast Encryption scheme is selective IND-CPA
secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Adv
s-ind-cpa
be (λ) = |Pr[β
′ = β]− 1/2|
is negligible.
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2.7.7 Key Policy-Attribute based Encryption
Let N the set of all user attributes. A key-policy attribute based encryption scheme
consists of four algorithms:
• Setup(1λ) : The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ as input and
outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MSK.
• Encrypt(M,L, PK) : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M , a set of attributes L ⊆ N , and outputs a
ciphertext CT .
• Key Generation(W,MSK,PK): The key generation algorithm takes as
input the master key MSK, public parameters PK, and an access structure
W , then outputs a private key SK.
• Decrypt(PK, CT , SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameters PK, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK, and outputs a
message M if L |= W or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
2.7.8 Security Definition for KP-ABE
We define the Selective IND-CPA security for KP-ABE via the following game.
• Init: The adversary commits to the challenge set of attributes L∗.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives PK to the adver-
sary.
• Phase 1: The adversary submits the access policy W for a KeyGen query.
If L∗ 6|= W , the challenger gives the adversary the secret key SKW . The
adversary can repeat this polynomially many times.
• Challenge: The adversary submits messages M0,M1 to the challenger. The
challenger flips a random coin β and passes the ciphertext Encrypt(PK,Mβ, L
∗)
to the adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess β′ of β.
Definition 10 We say a KP-ABE scheme is selective IND-CPA secure if for any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Adv
s-ind-cpa
kp−abe (λ) = |Pr[β
′ = β]− 1/2|
is negligible.
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2.7.9 Ciphertext Policy-Attribute based Encryption
Let N the set of all user attributes. A ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption
(CP-ABE) scheme consists of four algorithms:
• Setup(λ, U) : The setup algorithm takes security parameters and attribute
universe description as input. It outputs the public parameters PK and a
master key MSK.
• Encrypt(PK, M , W ) : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M , and access structure W over the universe of
attributes, and outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Key Generation(MSK, L): The key generation algorithm takes as input
the master key MSK and a set of attributes L ⊂ U , and outputs a private key
SK.
• Decrypt(PK, CT , SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameters PK, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK, and outputs a
message M or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
2.7.10 Security Definition for CP-ABE
We define the Selective IND-CPA security for CP-ABE via the following game.
• Init: The adversary commits to the challenge access structure W ∗.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives PK to the adver-
sary.
• Phase 1: The adversary submits the attribute list L for a KeyGen query. If
L 6|= W ∗, the challenger gives the adversary the secret key SKL. The adversary
can repeat this polynomially many times.
• Challenge: The adversary submits messages M0,M1 to the challenger. The
challenger flips a random coin β and passes the ciphertext Encrypt(PK,Mβ,W
∗)
to the adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess β′ of β.
Definition 11 We say a CP-ABE scheme is selective IND-CPA secure if for any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Adv
s-ind-cpa
cp−abe (λ) = |Pr[β
′ = β]− 1/2|
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Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
under Standard Assumptions
Access control (i.e., authentication and authorisation) plays an important role in
many information systems. Among all the existing cryptographic tools, Attribute
Based Encryption (ABE) has provided an effective way for fine-grained access con-
trol. ABE, which is an extension of identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84, BF01b],
allows an access structure/policy to be embedded into the ciphertext (this is referred
to as ciphertext-policy ABE, or CP-ABE) or user secret key (this is referred to as
key-policy ABE, or KP-ABE). In a CP-ABE, the user’s attributes used for key
generation must satisfy the access policy used for encryption in order to decrypt
the ciphertext, while in a KP-ABE, the user can only decrypt ciphertexts whose
attributes satisfy the policy embedded in the key. We can see that access control is
an inherent feature of ABE, and by using some expressive access structures, we can
effectively achieve fine-grained access control.
Related Work
Since its introduction in the seminal work of Sahai and Waters [SW05a], ABE
has been extensively studied in recent years (e.g., [GPSW06, BSW07, CN07, GJPS08,
Wat11b, ALP11, LW12, DJ12]). There are different ways to define an access struc-
ture/policy for ABE. The fuzzy IBE given by Sahai and Waters [SW05a], which
can be treated as the first KP-ABE, used a specific threshold access policy. Later,
the Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) realizable (or monotone) access structure
has been adopted by many subsequent ABE schemes [GPSW06, BSW07, GJPS08,
Wat11b]. In [CN07], Cheung and Newport proposed another way to define access
structure using AND-Gate with wildcard. To be more precise, for each attribute in
the universe, there are two possible values: positive and negative. A user’s attributes
are then defined by a sequence of positive and negative symbols w.r.t. each attribute
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in the universe (assuming that the attributes are placed in order in the universe).
An access structure is also defined by a sequence of positive and negative symbols,
plus a special wildcard (i.e., “don’t care”) symbol. Cheung and Newport showed
that by using this simple access structure, which is sufficient for many applications,
CP-ABE schemes can be constructed based on standard complexity assumptions.
Subsequently, several ABE schemes [NYO08, EMN+09, ZH10, CZF11] were pro-
posed following this specific access structure.
Our Contributions
In this chapter, we explore new techniques for the construction of CP-ABE
schemes based on the AND-gate with wildcard access structure. The existing
schemes of this type need to use three different elements to represent the three
possible values – positive, negative, and wildcard – of an attribute in the access
structure. We propose a new construction which uses only one element to represent
one attribute. The main idea behind our construction is to use the “positions” of
different symbols to perform the matching between the access policy and user at-
tributes. Specifically, We put the indices of all the positive, negative and wildcard
attributes defined in an access structure into three sets, and by using the technique
of Viète’s formulas [SLN+10], we allow the decryptor to remove all the wildcard
positions, and perform the decryption correctly if and only if the remaining user
attributes match those defined in the access structure. Our new technique leads to
a new CP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext size.
Although a secure ABE can well protect the secrecy of the encrypted data
against unauthorised access, it does not protect the privacy of the receivers/decryptors
by default. That is, given the ciphertext, an unauthorised user may still be able
to obtain some information of the data recipients. For example, a health organiza-
tion wants to send a message to all the patients that carry certain diseases. Then
the attribute universe will contain all the diseases, and an access policy will have
the format “+ + − ∗ ∗ + ...” where “+” (“−”) indicates positive (negative) for a
particular disease. If a CP-ABE cannot hide the access policy, then from the fact
whether a person can decrypt the message or not, people can directly learn some
sensitive information of the user. Therefore, it is also very important to hide the ac-
cess policy in such applications. However, most of the existing ABE schemes based
on AND-Gate with wildcard cannot achieve this property.
To address this problem, we further study the problem of hiding the access
policy for CP-ABE based on AND-Gate with wildcard. As the main contribution
of this work, we extend the technique we have used in the first construction to
bridge ABE based on AND-Gate with wildcard with Inner Product Encryption
(IPE) [KSW08a, SW08, ACP12]. Specifically, we present a way to convert an access
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policy containing positive, negative, and wildcard symbols into a vector ~X which
is used for encryption, and the user’s attributes containing positive and negative
symbols into another vector ~Y which is used in key generation, and then apply the
technique of IPE to do the encryption. Again, we use the positions of different
symbols and the Viète’s formulas [SLN+10] to perform the conversion. The details
are provided in Section 5.1.1.
3.1 Definition
3.1.1 CP-ABE Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme consists of four algorithms:
Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
• Setup(λ, U) : The setup algorithm takes security parameters and attribute
universe description as input. It outputs the public parameters PK and a
master key MSK.
• Encrypt(PK, M , W ) : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M , and access structure W over the universe of
attributes, and outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Key Generation(MSK, L): The key generation algorithm takes as input
the master key MSK and a set of attributes L ⊂ U , and outputs a private key
SK.
• Decrypt(PK, CT , SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameters PK, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK, and outputs a
message M or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
3.1.2 Security Definition for CP-ABE with Hidden Access
Policy
We define the Selective IND-CPA security for CP-ABE with hidden access policy
via the following game.
• Init: The adversary commits to the challenge access policies W0,W1.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives PK to the adver-
sary.
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• Phase 1: The adversary submits the attribute list L for a KeyGen query. If
(L |= W0∧L |= W1) or(L 6|= W0∧L 6|= W1), the challenger gives the adversary
the secret key SKL. The adversary can repeat this polynomially many times.
• Challenge: The adversary submits messages M0,M1 to the challenger. If the
adversary obtained the SKL whose associated attribute list L satisfies both
W0 and W1 in Phase 1, then it is required that M0 = M1 . The challenger
flips a random coin β and passes the ciphertext Encrypt(PK,Mβ,Wβ) to the
adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. If M0 6= M1 , the adversary cannot submit L
such that L |= W0 ∧ L |= W1.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess β′ of β.
We say a CP-ABE scheme with hidden access policy is secure if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial-time adversary A,




is negligible in the security parameter k.
Full Security. In the above selective security model, the adversary is required to
commit the challenge policy before seeing the system parameters. In the full security
model, the adversary can choose the challenge policy in the Challenge phase, which
makes the model stronger. However, we cannot directly prove the security of our
schemes in the full security model. We should note that there are transformations
from the selective security to full security [LDL11], and we can apply the same
transformation to our schemes presented in this chapter. However, the transformed
schemes will be based on composite order pairing groups, and hence less efficient.
3.2 Constructions
3.2.1 Efficient Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryp-
tion Under Decisional Linear Assumption
In this section, we present our first scheme based on the AND-Gate with wildcard
access policy. Below is the main idea of our construction.
We represent each attribute in the universe by an element Ai. Given an access
structure W , we first define three sets J , V , and Z where J contains the positions of
all the wildcard positions, and V and Z contain the positions of all the positive and
26
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negative attributes, respectively. We then represent each positive/negative attribute
in an access structure as shown in the following figure.
Figure 3.1: Access Policy
The set J is attached to the ciphertext and sent to the decryptor. In the








according to the Viète’s formulas, for each positive or negative attribute Atti asso-
ciated with the secret key. In this way, all the wildcard positions will take no effect
during decryption. Below are the details of our construction.
Setup(1λ): Let N1, N2, N3 be three upper bounds defined as N1 ≤ L: the maxi-
mum number of wildcard in an access structure; N2 ≤ L: the maximum number of
positive attribute in an attribute set S; N3 ≤ L: the maximum number of negative
attribute in an attribute set S.
The setup algorithm first generates bilinear groups G,GT with order p, and selects
three random generators V0, V1, g ∈ G. Then randomly choose α, β1, β2, a1, . . . , aL ∈R
Zp, and set Ω1 = e(g, V0)αβ1e(g, V1)αβ1 ,Ω2 = e(g, V0)αβ2e(g, V1)αβ2 . Let Ai = gai for
1 = 1, . . . , L.
The Public Key and Master Secret Key are defined as:
PK = (e, g,Ω1,Ω2, g
α, V0, V1, A1, . . . , AL),
MSK = (α, β1, β2, a1, . . . , aL).
Encrypt(W,M,PK): Suppose that the access structure W contains: n1 ≤ N1
wildcards which occur at positions J = {w1, . . . , wn1}; n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes
which occur at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2}; n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which
occur at positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3}. Compute for the wildcard positions {wj}
(j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n1) {λwj} and set tw =
∑n1
j=0 λwj . The encryption algorithm then
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The ciphertext is set as:
CT = (C0, C1, C2, C3, J = {w1, w2, . . . , wn1}).
KeyGen(MSK,S): Suppose that a user joins the system with the attribute list
S, which contains: n′2 ≤ N2 positive attributes which occur at positions V ′ =
{v′1, . . . , v′n′2}; n
′
3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur at positions Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n′3}.
By means of the Viète’s formulas, for all the positive positions {v′k} (k =




k=0 λv′k ; and for all the negative
positions {z′τ} (τ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n′3), calculate {λz′τ} and set t′z =
∑n′3
τ=0 λz′τ . The
algorithm then chooses s ∈R Zp and computes s1 = β1 + s, s2 = β2 + s and creates
the secret key as:
L1 = g
αs
t′v , L2 = g
αs
t′z ,
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∏
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∏
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∏
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The user secret key is set as:





Decrypt(CT, SK): The algorithm first identifies the wildcard positions in J =



































and M can be recovered by Ω−r11 Ω
−r2
2 · C0.
3.2.2 Hidden Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryp-
tion under Standard Assumptions
Although the CP-ABE scheme presented in the previous section can achieve con-
stant ciphertext size, it cannot hide the access policy since the wildcard positions
need to be included in the ciphertext. In this section, we extend the technique used
in our first construction to build another CPA-ABE which can hide the access policy.
One way to achieve the attribute hiding property is to apply the Inner Product En-
cryption technique in the construction of CP-ABE. Such an approach has been used
in previous works on policy hiding CP-ABE [LOS+10],[LDL11],[CCL+13]. However,
since our CP-ABE scheme is based on the Viète’s formula, we cannot directly use
the previous approach. In this chapter, we propose a new transformation technique
which can deal with the Viète’s formula.
Our Idea: Our main idea is to convert the access policy and user attributes
into two vectors, and then apply the technique of Inner Product Encryption to hide
the access policy. Similar to the first scheme, we separate the positive, negative,
and wildcard symbols in an access structure into three sets: V , Z, and J . Based on





with coefficients (a0, a1, . . . , an).














We then produce a vector
−→v = (a0, a1, . . . , an, 0n+1, . . . , 0N1 ,ΠV ,ΠZ)
which will be used for encryption.
In user key generation, we also separate the positive and negative attributes into
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two sets and construct two vectors




























ik, k = 0, . . . , N1.
Notice that we assume there are at most N1 wildcard positions in an access policy.
The decryption will be based on the inner products of (~v, ~xV ′) and (~v, ~xZ′), which
should both return 0 in order to have a successful decryption.
Let L = 4, N1 = 2 and W2 = (+,−, ∗, ∗) be the access policy. Then we create
three sets for wildcard positions J = {3, 4}, positive positions V = {1}, and negative
positions Z = {2}. Based on Viète’s formulas, we can calculate
a2 = 1; a1 = −7, a0 = 12
and obtain the vector ~v for the access policy and the vectors for Alice and Bob as
follows.
Figure 3.2: The vector ~v for access policy W2
Figure 3.3: The vector ~z for Alice and Bob
If we calculate the inner product of ~v and the two vectors of Alice, the product
will return 0, i.e., Alice’s attributes satisfy the access policy W2. On the other hand,
the inner product of (~v, ~Bobv) = 8 and (~v, ~Bobz) = 4, which means Bob’s attributes
cannot satisfy W2.
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Setup(1λ): Assume that we have L attributes in the universe, and each attribute
has two possible values: positive and negative. In addition, we also consider wildcard
(meaning “don’t care”) in access structures. Let N1, N2, N3 be three upper bounds
defined as :
N1 ≤ L: the maximum number of wildcard in an access structure;
N2 ≤ L: the maximum number of positive attribute in an attribute set S;
N3 ≤ L: the maximum number of negative attribute in an attribute set S.
The setup algorithm first randomly generates (g,G,GT , p, e) and sets n = N1+3.
It then chooses randomly γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, {u1,i}ni=1, t1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1, {w1,i}ni=1,
{z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1 in Zp and g2 in G. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp and obtains
{u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2 under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
For i from 1 to n, it creates:
U1,i = g
u1,i , U2,i = g
u2,i ,W1,i = g
w1,i ,W2,i = g
w2,i ,
T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i , Z1,i = g
z1,i ,
V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , V2 = g
θ2 .
Next it sets g1 = g
∆, Y = e(g, g2), and the public key PK and master key MSK as
PK = (g,G,GT , p, e, g1, Y, {U1,i, U2,i, T1,i, T2.i,W1.i,W2,i, Z1,i, Z2,i}ni=1, {Vi, Xi}2i=1)
MSK = (g2, {u1,i, u2,i, t1,i, t2,i, w1,i, w2,i, z1,i, z2,i}ni=1, {vi, xi}2i=1).
Encrypt(W,M,PK): Suppose that the access structure W contains: n1 ≤ N1
wildcards which occur at positions J = {w1, . . . , wn1}; n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes
which occur at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2}; n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur
at positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3}. Based on Viète’s formulas, compute for the wildcard
positions {wj} (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n1)
an1 = 1
an1−1 = −(w1 + w2 + . . .+ wn1)
an1−2 = (w1w2 + w1w3 + . . .+ wn1−1wn1)
. . .
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It creates a vector ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) as:
~v = (a0, a1, . . . , an1 , 0n1+1, . . . , 0N1 ,ΠV ,ΠZ).
The encryption algorithm chooses random s1, s2, α, β ∈ Zp and creates the ciphertext
as follows:
Cm = M · Y s2 , CA = gs2 , CB = gs11 ,






















Then ciphertext CT is set as:
CT = (Cm, CA, CB, {C1,i, C2,i, C3,i, C4,i}ni=1).
KeyGen(MSK,S): Suppose that a user joins the system with the attribute list
S, which contains: n′2 ≤ N2 positive attributes which occur at positions V ′ =
{v′1, . . . , v′n′2}; n
′
3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur at positions Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n′3}.
By means of the Viète’s formulas, for all the positive positions {v′k} (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n′2),








ik, k = 0, . . . , N1
It creates vectors −→xV and −→xZ as:
−→xV = (v′0, v′1, . . . , v′N1 , 1, 0).
−→xZ = (z′0, z′1,+ . . . , z′N1 , 0, 1).
The key generation algorithm chooses randomly ri,1, ri,2 for i = 1 to n, and f1, f2, r1, r2 ∈
Zp, and then creates the secret key as follows:
{K1,i,K2,i} = {g−γ2r1,igf1xViu2,i , gγ1r1,ig−f1xViu1,i},
{K3,i,K4,i} = {g−θ2r2,igf2xZiw2,i , gθ1r2,ig−f2xZiw1,i},















The secret key is set as:
SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1).
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Correctness:








= e(g, g)r1,is1(−u1,iγ2) · e(g, g)−r1,iviαγ1γ2 · e(g,K1,i)t1,is2
·e(g, g)f1xViu1,iu2,is1 · e(g, g)f1vixViαγ1u2,i .








= e(g, g)r1,is1u2,iγ1 · e(g, g)r1,iviαγ1γ2 · e(g,K2,i)t2,is2




i=1 e(Cj,i, Kj,i) =
∏n
i=1 e(g, g)





i=1 e(Cj,i, Kj,i) =
∏n
i=1 e(g, g)



















e(CA, KA) = e(g

































Therefore, the message M will be returned iff (~v,−→xV ) = 0 and (~v,−→xZ) = 0, meaning
the attributes list in user key SK satisfies the access policy in the ciphertext CT .
3.3 Security Proof
3.3.1 Security Proof-Efficient CP-ABE Under Decisional Lin-
ear Assumption
Theorem 4 Assume that the DLIN assumption holds in G, then no polynomial-
time adversary can have a non-negligible advantage over random guess in the Selec-
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tive IND-CPA security game.
Proof : Let B denote an algorithm that is given (g, ga, gb, gac, gd, T ) ∈ G6 as
input. B’s goal is to decide T = gb(c+d) or T = gr.
Init: The adversary gives B the challenge access structure W ∗ = [W ∗1 , . . . ,W ∗L]
which contains n1 wildcards which occur at positions J = {w1, . . . , wn1}, n2 positive
attributes which occur at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2}, n3 negative attributes which
occur at positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3} at the beginning of the game.
Setup: B chooses an upper bound n1 ≤ N1 ≤ L for the number of wildcard in an
access structure, and then selects σ1, σ2, σ3 ∈R Zp. B also selects γ0, γ1, {a′i}1≤i≤L ∈R








































, atti 6= W ∗i
B sets Ω1 = e(ga, V0)σ1−σ2e(ga, V1)σ1−σ2 and Ω2 = e(gσ3(ga)−σ2 , V0)e(gσ3(ga)−σ2 , V1),
and the public key as:
PK = (e, g,Ω1,Ω2, g
a, V0, V1, A1, . . . , AL)
and the corresponding master secret key is:
MSK = (α = a, β1 = σ1 − σ2, β2 =
σ3
a
− σ2, a1, . . . , aL)
Phase 1: A submits an attribute list L = [L1, ..., LL] in a secret key query, consisting
of n′2 ≤ N2 positive attributes at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn′2}, and n
′
3 ≤ N3 negative
attributes at positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn′3}. B computes:
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Challenge: The adversary gives two messages M0 and M1 to B.Then B flips a
coin ν and outputs:
C0 = Mνe(g
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)c+d = T γ1ν ,
which implicitly sets r1 = c and r2 = d.
Phase II: Same as Phase I.
Guess: The adversary will eventually output a guess ν ′ of ν. The simulator
outputs 0 to guess that Z = gb(c+d) if ν ′ = ν; otherwise, it outputs 1 to guess that
Z is a random group element of G.
If Z = gb(c+d), the simulator B gives a perfect simulation so we have:
Pr[B(1k, g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) = 1|Z = gb(c+d)] = 1
2
+ AdvA(k).
If Z is a random group element the message Mβ is completely hidden from the
adversary and we have:
Pr[B(1k, g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) = 1|Z = gr] = 1
2
.
Therefore, B can solve DLIN with non-negligible advantage if AdvA(k) is non-
negligible.
3.3.2 Security Proof-Hidden CP-ABE
Theorem 5 Assume the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and Deci-
sional Linear Assumption hold in group G, then our Hidden CP-ABE scheme is
selective IND-CPA secure and policy hiding.
Since our scheme actually uses the vector corresponding to an access policy to
do the encryption. In order to prove that our scheme is policy hiding, we only need
to prove that the adversary cannot tell which vector, among the two vectors ~v and ~x
37
Chapter 3. Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption under Standard Assumptions 38
corresponding to W0 and W1 respectively, has been used to generate the ciphertext.
In our proof we will consider two cases M0 = M1 and M0 6= M1.
In the caseM0 = M1, we only consider the following game sequence from Game1
to Game5. In this case, we only prove the property of attribute hiding. For the
other case M0 6= M1, we need to consider the whole proof from Game0 to Game6.
Below we first give a high level description of each game. In each game, we separate
the vector used to generate (CA, CB, C1,i, C2,i) from the vector for (CA, CB, C3,i, C4,i).
However, the same vector is used for both parts in Game0 and Game6.
Game0 : The challenge ciphertext CT0 is generated under (~v,~v) and M0. The
ciphertext CT0 is computed as follows:























Game1 : The challenge ciphertext CT1 is generated under (~v,~v) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT1 is computed as follows:























Game2 : The challenge ciphertext CT2 is generated under (~v,~0) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT2 is computed as follows:



















Game3 : The challenge ciphertext CT3 is generated under (~v, ~x) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT3 is computed as follows:























Game4 : The challenge ciphertext CT4 is generated under (~0, ~x) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT4 is computed as follows:



















Game5 : The challenge ciphertext CT5 is generated under (~x, ~x) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT5 is computed as follows:























Game6 : The challenge ciphertext CT6 is generated under (~x, ~x) and message M1 ∈
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GT . The ciphertext CT6 is computed as follows:
























Indistinguishability between Game0 and Game1
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can distinguish the two games
with a non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A
to solve the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem also with advantage ε. On
input (g, A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z) ∈ G4, B simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup: B selects random elements γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, λ,{u1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1,
{w1,i}ni=1, {z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1, in Zp.
Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp to obtain {u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1 under the con-
dition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
Then for i = 1 to n, B sets:
U1,i = g
u1,i , U2,i = g
u2,i , T1,i = (g
b)viγ1gt1,i , T2,i = (g
b)viγ2gt2,i ,
W1,i = g
w1,i ,W2,i = g
w2,i , Z1,i = (g




γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , X2 = g
θ2 , g1 = g
∆, Y = e(ga, gb)−∆ · e(g, g)λ.
Each public key component is distributed properly following the random ex-
ponents:
t1,i = viγ1b+ t1,i, t2,i = viγ2b+ t2,i, z1,i = viθ1b+ z1,i, z2,i = viθ2b+ z2,i,
g2 = g
−ab∆gλ.
• Key Generation Phase 1 & 2: A issues private key queries for the at-
tribute list L. Consider a query with two vectors ~yV = (yV1 , . . . , yVn) and
~yZ = (yZ1 , . . . , yZn). A can request the private key query as long as (−→v ,−→y V ) =
(−→v ,−→y Z) = cy 6= 0.
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which implicitly sets: f1 =
a
2cy





























which implicitly sets: f2 =
a
2cy


















































yVi (u1,it2,i−u2,it1,i) · (K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i .











yZi (w1,iz2,i−w2,iz1,i) · (K ′3,i)−z1,i · (K ′4,i)−z2,i·
Since g2 = g











·(K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i · (K ′3,i)−z1,i · (K ′4,i)−z2,i .
B gives A the private key: SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1) for the
queried vector ~y.
• Challenge Ciphertext: To generate a challenge ciphertext, B picks random
s′1, α
′, β′ ∈ Zp. B implicitly sets:
s1 = s
′
1, s2 = c, α = −bc+ α′, β = −bc+ β′.
Then B sets A = gc = gs2 , B = g∆s1 = gs11 . For i from 1 to n, B computes:
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C1,i = (g
u1,i)s1((gb)viγ1gt1,i)cgviγ1(−bc+α


























Next B computes Cm = Z∆ · e(g, gc)λ · M0. If Z = e(g, g)abc the challenge
ciphertext is distributed in Game0, otherwise if Z is randomly chosen in
GT , then the challenge ciphertext is distributed in Game1. Hence, if A can
distinguish these two games, B can solve the DBDH problem.
Indistinguishability between Game1 and Game2
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can distinguish these two games
with non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A to
solve the Decision Linear problem with advantage ε. On input (g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) ∈
G6, B simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup: B selects random elements γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, λ,
{u1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1, {w1,i}ni=1, {z1,i}ni=1,
{z2,i}ni=1 in Zp. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp to obtain {u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2
under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ,∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i,
Then for i = 1 to n, B sets:
U1,i = (g
a)u1,i , U2,i = (g
a)u2,i , T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i ,
W1,i = (g
a)w1,i(gb)θ1vi ,W2,i = (g
a)w2,i(gb)θ2vi , Z1,i = g
z1,i(gb)θ1vi , Z2,i = g
z2,i(gb)θ2vi , .
V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , X2 = g
θ2 , g1 = (g
a)∆, g2 = g
λ.
Each public key component is distributed properly following the random ex-
ponents:
u1,i = au1,i, u2,i = au2,i, w1,i = aw1,i + θ1bvi, w2,i = aw2,i + θ2bvi,
z1,i = viθ1b+ z1,i, z2,i = viθ2b+ z2,i.
• Key Generation Phase 1 & 2: A issues private key queries for the attribute
list L. Consider a query will be created two vectors ~yV = (yV1 , . . . , yVn) and













1,ig−f1yViu1,i = g−γ1viyVib ·K ′2,i,
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2,ig−f2yZiw1,i = gθ1viyZib ·K ′4,i,
which implicitly sets: r2,i = yZivib+ ar
′
2,i.




















































Since g2 = g









B gives A the private key: SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1, ) for the
queried vector ~y.
• Challenge Ciphertext: To generate a challenge ciphertext, B picks random
s′1, α
′ ∈ Zp. B implicitly sets:
s1 = c, s2 = d, α = α
′
Then B sets: A = gd = gs2 , B = (gac)∆ = gs11 . For i from 1 to n, B computes:
C1,i = (g
au1,i)c(gd)t1,igviγ1(α












Next B computes for i from 1 to n:
C3,i = (g
aw1,i)c(gd)z1,iZθ1vi , C4,i = (g
aw2,i)c(gd)z2,iZθ2vi .
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If Z = gb(c+d)g
r
















If Z = gb(c+d), then B is simulating Game2
C3,i = (g




aw2,i)c(gd)z2,i(gb(c+d))θ2vi = W s12,iZ
s2
2,i.
Therefore, if A can distinguish the two games, B can solve the DLIN problem.
Indistinguishability of Game2 and Game3
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can distinguish these two games
with a non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B that uses A to
solve the Decision Linear problem with advantage ε. On input (g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) ∈
G6, B simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup: B selects random elements γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, λ, {u1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1,
{w1,i}ni=1, {z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1, in Zp. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp to obtain
{u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2 under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ,∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
Then for i = 1 to n, B sets:
U1,i = (g
a)u1,i , U2,i = (g
a)u2,i , T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i ,
W1,i = (g
a)w1,i(gb)θ1vi ,W2,i = (g
a)w2,i(gb)θ2vi ,
Z1,i = g
z1,i(gb)θ1vi , Z2,i = g
z2,i(gb)θ2xi , .V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , X2 = g
θ2 ,
g1 = (g
a)∆, g2 = g
λ.
Each public key component is distributed properly following the random ex-
ponents:
u1,i = au1,i, u2,i = au2,i, w1,i = aw1,i + θ1bvi, w2,i = aw2,i + θ2bxi,
z1,i = viθ1b+ z1,i, z2,i = viθ2b+ z2,i.
• Key Generation Phase 1 & 2: A issues private key queries for the at-
tribute list L. Consider a query will be created two vectors ~yV = (yV1 , . . . , yVn)
and ~yZ = (yZ1 , . . . , yZn). Notice that A obey the restrictions defined in the
model. That is (~v, ~yV ) = (~v, ~yZ) = 0 mod p if and only if (~x, ~yV ) mod p and
(~x, ~yZ) mod p. There are two cases we need to consider.
– Case 1: (~v, ~yV ) = 0 = (~x, ~yZ) mod p. In this case, B picks random
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1,i)gf1(yVi )u2,i = gγ2vi(yVi )bg−γ2r
′
1,igf1(yVi )u2,i




1,i)gf1(yVi )u1,i = g−γ1vi(yVi )bgγ2r
′
1,igf1(yVi )u1,i
= g−γ1vi(yVi )b ·K ′2,i,





2,i)gf2(yZi )w2,i = g−θ2xi(yZi )bg−γ2r
′
2,iagf2(yZi )u2,i




2,i)gf2(yZi )w1,i = gθ1xi(yZi )bgθ2ar
′
2,igf2(yZi )w1,i
= gθ1xi(yZi )b ·K ′4,i,
which implicitly sets: r2,i = xiyZib+ ar
′
2,i









































Since g2 = g





−γ2viyVibt1,igγ1viyVibt2,i · (K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i
·g−(xiyZib+ar′2,i)∆g(f2yZiw2,i)(−z1,i−θ1bxi) · g(−f2yZiw1,i)(−z2,i−θ2bxi).
B gives A the private key SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1 for
the queried vector ~y.
– Case 2: (~v, ~yV ) = cv 6= 0 and (~x, ~yZ) = cx 6= 0. In this case, B picks
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= g−γ1cxviyVib ·K ′2,i.















= gθ1cvxiyZib ·K ′4,i.
which implicitly sets: r2,i = cvxiyZib+ ar
′
2,i, r2









































Since g2 = g





−γ2cxviyVibt1,igγ1cxviyVibt2,i · (K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i
·g−(cvxiyZib+ar′2,i)∆g(f2yZiw2,i)(−z1,i−θ1bxi) · g(−f2yZiw1,i)(−z2,i−θ2bxi)
B gives A the private key SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1) for
the queried vector ~y.
45
Chapter 3. Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption under Standard Assumptions 46
• Challenge Ciphertext: To generate a challenge ciphertext, B picks random
s′1, α
′ ∈ Zp. B implicitly sets:
s1 = c, s2 = d, α = α
′
Then B sets: A = gd = gs2 , B = (gac)∆ = gs11 . For i from 1 to n, B computes:
C1,i = (g
au1,i)c(gd)t1,igviγ1(α
































Otherwise, if Z = gb(c+d)g
r
for r chosen randomly in Zp, then B is playing
Game3 with A by setting β = r
C3,i = (g




aw2,i)c(gd)z2,i(gb(c+d))θ2vi = W s12,iZ
s2
2,i.
Therefore, if A can distinguish Game2 from Game3, then B can solve the
DLIN problem.
The rest of the proof is similar to the above proofs:
• the indistinguishability between Game3 and Game4 can be proved in the same
way as for Game2 and Game3;
• the indistinguishability between Game4 and Game5 can be proved in the same
way as for Game1 and Game2;
• the indistinguishability of Game5 and Game6 can be proved in the same way
as for Game0 and Game1. 
3.4 Comparisons
In Table 3.1, we give a detailed comparison among the existing CP-ABE schemes
based on the AND-Gate access structure where p denotes the pairing operation, e
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denotes the exponentiation operation, and t is the number of attributes involved in
the access structure. In Table 3.1, n1 << t is the maximum number of wildcard
involved in the access structure.
Table 3.1: Comparison among CP-ABE with Hidden AND-Gate access structure
Scheme Ciphertext Length Dec Cost Wildcard Assumption Hidden Policy
CN[CN07] |GT |+ (t+ 1)|G| (t+ 1)p
√
DBDH X




Emura et al.[EMN+09] |GT |+ 2|G| 2p X DBDH X
ZH[ZH10] |GT |+ 2|G| 2tp + 1
√
n-BDHE X
CZF[CZF11] |GT |+ 2|G| 2p X n-BDHE X
Our first scheme |GT |+ 4|G| 6p
√
DLIN X





In this chapter, we presented two new constructions of Ciphertext Policy Attribute
Based Encryption for the AND-Gate with wildcard access policy. Our first scheme
achieves constant ciphertext size, but cannot hide the access policy. On the other
hand, our second scheme can even hide the access policy against the legitimate
decryptors. We proved that our second construction is secure under the Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the Decision Linear assumptions.
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Chapter 4
Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption with
Short Ciphertext and Decryption Key
Broadcast encryption (BE), introduced by Berkovits [Ber91] and Fiat and Naor
[FN93], is a very useful tool for securing a broadcast channel. In a traditional BE
scheme, a broadcaster can specify a subset of privileged users (out of the user uni-
verse) as the legitimate receivers of a message. Due to the practicality of broadcast
encryption in real-world applications, many BE schemes have been proposed in var-
ious settings since its introduction (e.g., [NNL01, DF03, BGW05, BW06, DPP07,
GW09, PPSS12]).
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE), first introduced by Sahai and Waters [SW05a],
allows an encrypter to embed a fine-grained access policy into the ciphertext when
encrypting a message. There are two types of ABE. In a Ciphertext Policy (CP)
ABE system, each user secret key is associated with a set of user attributes, and
every ciphertext is associated with an access policy. A ciphertext can be decrypted
by a secret key if and only if the attributes associated with the secret key satisfy
the access policy in the ciphertext. Key Policy (KP) ABE is the dual form of CP-
ABE, where attributes are used in the encryption process, and access policies are
used in the user secret key generation. ABE systems can provide fine-grained access
control of encrypted data, and has been extensively studied in recent years (e.g.,
[GPSW06, BSW07, CN07, Wat11a, ALDP11, LW12]).
Since ABE gives a one-to-many relationship between a ciphertext and the corre-
sponding valid decryption keys, it can be considered as a natural broadcast encryp-
tion where the legitimate decryptors are defined by the access policies (CP-ABE)
or the attributes (KP-ABE) associated with the ciphertext. As pointed out in
[GPSW06, JK10], ABE is useful in some broadcasting systems, such as Pay TV,
which require dynamic and flexible access control. For example, the broadcasting
company can specify an access policy ((Location: City A) AND (Age: > 18)) when
48
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generating an encrypted data stream for a TV program, and the access policy may
be changed to ((Location: City A) AND (Age: *)) (here ‘*’ denotes the wildcard
symbol, meaning “don’t care”) for the next program. However, one drawback of
using ABE for broadcasting is that the cost of revoking a user (e.g., those fail to
pay the subscription fee for Pay TV) is very high, since the secret keys of all the
other non-revoked users must be updated.
Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE) is a combination of ABE and
BE. Specifically, in a CP-ABBE scheme, a user secret key SK is associated with
a user identity (or index) ID and a set of user attributes L, and a ciphertext CT
generated by the broadcaster is associated with a user list S and an access policy
W . The ciphertext CT can be decrypted using SK if and only if L satisfies W
(denoted by L |= W ) and ID ∈ S. KP-ABBE is the dual form of CP-ABBE where
the positions of the attributes and the access policy are swapped. We can see that
similar to normal ABE, ABBE also allows fine-grained and flexible access control.
On the other hand, ABBE can provide direct revocation, which is difficult or expen-
sive to achieve in normal ABE systems. Direct revocation means the broadcaster
can directly exclude some revoked users without affecting any non-revoked users,
and ABBE can easily achieve this by removing the revoked users from the receiver
set S. As highlighted in [AI09, JK10], direct revocation is important for real-time
broadcasting applications such as Pay TV.
Related Work
Several ABBE schemes [LS08, AI09, JK10] have been proposed in the literature.
In [LS08], Lubicz and Sirvent proposed a CP-ABBE scheme which allows access poli-
cies to be expressed in disjunctive normal form, with the OR function provided by
ciphertext concatenation. Attrapadung and Imai [AI09] proposed two KP-ABBE
and two CP-ABBE schemes, which are constructed by algebraically combining some
existing BE schemes (namely, the Boneh-Gentry-Waters BE scheme [BGW05] and
the Sahai-Waters BE scheme [SW08]) with some existing ABE schemes (namely, the
KP-ABE scheme by Goyal et al. [GPSW06] and the CP-ABE scheme by Waters
[Wat11a]). Junod and Karlov [JK10] also proposed a CP-ABBE scheme that sup-
ports boolean access policies with AND, OR and NOT gates. Junod and Karlov’s
scheme achieved direct revocation by simply treating each user’s identity as a unique
attribute in the attribute universe.
Contributions
In order to use ABBE in real-time applications such as Pay TV, the bandwidth
requirement and the decryption cost are the most important factors to be considered.
Unfortunately, the ciphertext size of the existing ABBE schemes reviewed above is
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quite high. The motivation of this work is to construct efficient ABBE schemes in
terms of ciphertext and key size, as well as decryption cost.
The contributions of this work are two efficient ABBE schemes allowing ac-
cess policies to be expressed using AND-gate with positive (+), negative (−), and
wildcard (∗) symbols. To give a high-level picture of our constructions, we use
the positions of different symbols (i.e., positive, negative, and wildcard) to do the
matching between the access structure (containing wildcards) and the attribute list
(containing no wildcard) in the ABE underlying ABBE schemes. We put the indices
of all the positive, negative and wildcard attributes defined in an access structure
into three sets. By using the Viète’s formulas [SLN+10], based on the wildcard set,
the decryptor can remove all the wildcard positions, and obtain the correct message
if and only if the remaining positive and negative attributes have a perfect posi-
tion match. We then incorporate the technique of Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast
encryption scheme [BGW05] into our ABE scheme to enable direct revocation.
Our first ABBE scheme is key policy based, and achieves constant key size
and short ciphertext size. The second scheme is ciphertext policy based, achieving
constant ciphertext size and short key size. Both schemes require only constant
number of pairing operations in decryption.
4.1 Definition
4.1.1 KP-ABBE Definition
Let U denote the set of all user indices, and N the set of all user attributes. A
key-policy attribute based broadcast encryption scheme consists of four algorithms:
• Setup(1λ) : The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ as input and
outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MSK.
• Encrypt(S, L,M, PK) : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M , a set of user index S ⊆ U and a set of attributes
L ⊆ N , and outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Key Generation(ID,W,MSK,PK): The key generation algorithm takes
as input the master key MSK, public parameters PK, a user index ID ∈ U ,
and an access structure W , and outputs a private key SK.
• Decrypt(PK, CT , SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameters PK, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK, and outputs a
message M or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
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4.1.2 Security Definition for KP-ABBE
We define the Selective IND-CPA security for KP-ABBE via the following game.
• Init: The adversary commits to the challenge user indices S∗ and target at-
tribute set L∗.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives PK to the adver-
sary.
• Phase 1: The adversary queries for private keys with pairs of user index and
access structure (ID,W ) such that L∗ 6|= W or ID /∈ S∗.
• Challenge: The adversary submits messages M0,M1 to the challenger . The
challenger flips a random coin β and passes the ciphertext ct∗
= Encrypt(PK,Mβ, L
∗, S∗) to the adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess β′ of β.
Definition 12 We say a KP-ABBE scheme is selective IND-CPA secure if for any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Adv
s-ind-cpa
kp (λ) = |Pr[β
′ = β]− 1/2|
is a negligible function of λ.
4.1.3 CP-ABBE Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute based broadcast encryption scheme consists of four
algorithms:
• Setup(1λ) : The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1λ as input and
outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MSK.
• Encrypt(S,W,M,PK) : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M , an access structure W , a set of user index
S ⊆ U , and outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Key Generation(ID,L,MSK,PK): The key generation algorithm takes as
input the master key MSK, public parameters PK, a user index ID ∈ U ,
and a set of attributes L ⊆ N , and outputs a private key SK.
• Decrypt(PK, CT , SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameters PK, a ciphertext CT , and a private key SK, and outputs a
message M or a special symbol ‘⊥’.
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4.1.4 Security Definition for CP-ABBE
. We define the Selective IND-CPA security for CP-ABBE via the following game.
• Init: The adversary commits to the challenge user indices S∗ and target access
structure W ∗.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives PK to the adver-
sary.
• Phase 1: The adversary queries for private keys with pairs of user index and
a user attribute list (ID,L) such that L 6|= W ∗ or ID /∈ S∗.
• Challenge: The adversary submits messages M0,M1 to the challenger . The
challenger flips a random coin β and passes the ciphertext ct∗
= Encrypt(PK,Mβ,W
∗, S∗) to the adversary.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess β′ of β.
Definition 13 We say a CP-ABBE scheme is selective IND-CPA secure if for any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Advs-ind-cpacp (λ) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2|
is a negligible function of λ.
4.2 Constructions
4.2.1 KP-ABBE Scheme
In our KP-ABBE scheme, we assume that |U | ≤ n and |N | ≤ n where n is a system
parameter. Let N1, N2, N3 be three upper bounds for the user attributes:
-N1: the maximum number of wildcard in an access structure.
-N2: the maximum number of positive attribute in an attribute list L.
-N3: the maximum number of negative attribute in an attribute list L.
Setup(1λ): The setup algorithm first generates bilinear groups G,GT with order
p, and selects random generators g, h1, . . . , hN ∈R G, and α ∈R Zp. Then compute
gi = g
αi ∈ G for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n+2, . . . , 2n, randomly choose γ, δ, θ, x1, . . . , xN1 ∈R
Zp, and set:
ν = gγ, V0 = g
δ, V1 = g
θ,
V01 = (g
δ)x1 , . . . , V0N1 = (g
δ)xN1 ,
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V11 = (g
θ)x1 , . . . , V1N1 = (g
θ)xN1 ,
The public key and master secret key are defined as:
PK = (g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, h1, . . . , hN , ν, V0, V1, V01, . . . , V0N1 , V11, . . . , V1N1)
MSK = (α, γ, δ, θ, x1, . . . , xN1).
Encrypt(S, L,M, PK): Given a user index set S ⊆ U , an attribute list L which
contains:
-n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2};
-n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes at positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3};
the algorithm randomly chooses r ∈ Zp and computes:















































The ciphertext is CT = (C0, C1, C2, C3,0, . . . , C3,N1 , C4,0, . . . , C4,N1)
Key Generation(ID,W,MSK,PK): Suppose that the access structure W con-
tains:
- n1 ≤ N1 wildcards at positions J = {w1, . . . , wn1}.
- n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes at positions V ′ = {v′1, . . . , v′n2}.
- n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes at positions Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n3}.
Randomly choose s1, s2 ∈ Zp, and apply the Viete formulas on J to compute
ak(0 ≤ k ≤ n1) and set t =
n1∑
k=0
xkak where x0 = 1. Then compute
D1 = g
αIDγ+δs1+θs2 , D2 = g
s1






















and set the secret key SK = (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5).
Decrypt(PK,CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first applies the Viete formulas
on J included in the secret key to compute ak for 0 ≤ k ≤ n1, and
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e(D1, C1) = e(g
αIDγ+δs1+θs2 , gr)
= e(gα
IDγ, gr)e(g, g)δs1re(g, g)θs2r












































gn+1−j+ID, C1) = e(g






























































































Our CP-ABBE scheme is the dual-form of our KP-ABBE scheme.
Setup(1λ): The setup algorithm first generates bilinear groups G,GT with order
p, and selects random generators g, h1, . . . , hN ∈R G, and α ∈R Zp. Then compute
gi = g
αi ∈ G for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n + 2, . . . , 2n, randomly choose γ, δ, θ ∈R Zp, and
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set:
ν = gγ, V0 = g
δ, V1 = g
θ.
The public key and master secret key are defined as:
PK = (g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, h1, . . . , hN , ν, V0, V1)
MSK = (α, γ, δ, θ).
Encrypt(S,W,M,PK): Given a user index set S ⊆ U , and an access structure W
containing:
- n1 ≤ N1 wildcards at positions J = {w1, . . . , wn1};
- n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2};
- n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes at positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3};
the algorithm randomly chooses r ∈ Zp and computes:






















The ciphertext is CT = (J,C0, C1, C2, C3, C4).
Key Generation(ID,L,MSK,PK): Given a user identity ID and an attribute
list L which contains:
-n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes at positions V ′ = {v′1, . . . , v′n2};
-n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes at positions Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n3};
randomly choose s1, s2 ∈ Zp and compute:
D1 = g
αIDγ+δs1+θs2 , D2 = g












































and set the secret key SK = (D1, D2, D3, D4,0, . . . , D4,N1 , D5,0, . . . , D5,N1).
Decrypt(PK,CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first applies the Viete formulas
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on J included in the ciphertext to compute ak for 0 ≤ k ≤ n1:
e(D1, C1) = e(g
αIDγ+δs1+θs2 , gr)
= e(gα





































































gn+1−j+ID, C1) = e(g
αID , ν)r · e(gn, g1)r
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4.3 Security Proof
We prove that the proposed KP-ABBE and CP-ABBE schemes are selectively secure
under the Decision n-BDHE assumption.
Theorem 6 Assume that the Decision n-BDHE assumption holds, then no polynomial-
time adversary against our KP-ABBE scheme can have a non-negligible advantage
over random guess in the Selective IND-CPA security game.
Proof : Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can attack our scheme with
non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A to solve
the Decision n-BDHE problem. On input (g, h,−→y g,α,n = (g1, g2, . . . , gn,
gn+2, . . . , g2n), T ), where gi = g
αi and for some unknown α ∈ Z∗p, the goal of B is to
determine whether T = e(gn+1, h) or a random element of GT .
Init: A gives B the challenge user indices S∗ and the target attribute set L∗
with n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes which occur at positions V ∗ = {v∗1, . . . , v∗n2}, and
n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur at positions Z∗ = {z∗1 , . . . , z∗n3} at the
beginning of the game.



























n+1−iij , for j = 0, . . . , N1
where x0 = 1, and hi = g
ui−αn+1−i , then B sets public key as:
PK = (g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, h1, . . . , hN , ν, V0, V1, V01, . . . , V0N1 , V11, . . . , V1N1).
Phase 1: A submits a pair of user index and access structure (ID,W ) in a secret key
query, which satisfies L∗ 6|= W or ID /∈ S∗. Assume W consists of n1 ≤ N1 wildcards
which occur at positions J = {w1, . . . , wn1}, n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes which occur
at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2}, and n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur at
positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3}. B applies the Viete formulas on J = {j1, . . . , jn1} to
get ak and set t =
n1∑
k=0
xkak. Consider the following two cases in Phase 1:
• Case 1: ID /∈ S∗.
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• Case 2: ID ∈ S∗.
In this case, due to the constraint L∗ 6|= W , W has at least one position i∗
which has a different attribute value from L∗, which means {V ∪ Z∗} 6= ∅ or
{Z ∪ V ∗} 6= ∅.
 If there exists an i∗ ∈ {V ∪ Z∗} 6= ∅:
B selects two random numbers s′1, s′2 ∈ Zp and implicitly sets s1, s2 as:s1 = s′1s2 = s′2 + αi∗ by setting D2 = gs′1 = gs1 , D3 = gs′2+αi
∗
= gs2 . Then B
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We should note that since i∗ /∈ Z, the item gαn+1 will not occur in the
calculation of D5.
 If there exists an i∗ ∈ {Z ∪ V ∗} 6= ∅:
the simulation can be performed in a similar way by choosing two random
numbers s′1, s
′
2 ∈ Zp and implicitly setting s1, s2 as:






by setting D2 = g
s′1+α
i∗
= gs1 , D3 = g
s′2 = gs2 . Then B can compute














































































































































We should note that since i∗ /∈ V , the item gαn+1 will not occur in the
calculation of D5.
B returns to A the secret key SK = (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5).
Challenge: The adversary gives two messages M0 and M1 to B. Then B flips
a coin b and generates the challenge ciphertext by setting C1 = g
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B then sends the following challenge ciphertext to A
CT ∗ = (MbT,C1, C2, {C3,k}, {C4,k})
Phase II: Same as Phase I.
Guess: A output b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0.
Analysis: If T = e(gn+1, h), then the simulation is the same as in the real game.
Hence, A will have the probability 1
2
+ ε to guess b correctly. If T is a random
element of GT , then A will have probability 12 to guess b correctly. Therefore, B can
solve the Decision n-BDHE assumption also with advantage ε. 
Theorem 7 Assume that the Decision n-BDHE assumption holds, then no polynomial-
time adversary against our CP-ABBE scheme can have a non-negligible advantage
over random guess in the Selective IND-CPA security game.
Proof : Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can attack our scheme with
non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A to solve
the Decision n-BDHE problem. On input (g, h,−→y g,α,n = (g1, g2, . . . , gn,
gn+2, . . . , g2n), T ), where gi = g
αi and for some unknown α ∈ Z∗p, the goal of B is to
determine whether T = e(gn+1, h) or a random element of GT .
Init: A gives B the challenge user indexes S∗ and the challenge access structure
W ∗ with n1 ≤ N1 wildcards which occur at positions J∗ = {w∗1, . . . , w∗n1}, n2 ≤ N2
positive attributes which occur at positions V ∗ = {v∗1, . . . , v∗n2}, n3 ≤ N3 negative
attributes which occur at positions Z∗ = {z∗1 , . . . , z∗n3} at the beginning of the game.












































and hi = g
ui−αn+1−i , then B sets public key as:
PK = (g, g1, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n, h1, . . . , hN , ν, V0, V1).
Phase 1: A submits (ID,L) in a secret key query, where L 6|= W ∗ “or” ID /∈
S∗. Suppose the attribute set L contains n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes which occur
at positions V = {v1, . . . , vn2}, and n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur at
positions Z = {z1, . . . , zn3}. We consider two cases in Phase 1:
60
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• Case 1: ID /∈ S∗










































































• Case 2: ID ∈ S∗
In this case, due to the constraint L 6|= W ∗, L has at least one position i∗
which has a different attribute value from W ∗, which means {V ∪ Z∗} 6= ∅ or
{Z ∪ V ∗} 6= ∅.
 If there exists i∗ ∈ {V ∪ Z∗} 6= ∅:











by settingD2 = g


































































































































































































 If there exists an i∗ ∈ {Z ∪ V ∗} 6= ∅:
the simulation can be performed in a similar way by choosing two random
numbers s′1, s
′





















= gs1 , D3 = g
s′2 = gs2 . Then B can compute

























































































































































































B returns to A the secret key SK = (D1, D2, D3, {D4,k}, {D5,k}).
Challenge: The adversary gives two messages M0 and M1 to B. Then B flips
a coin b and generates the challenge ciphertext by setting C1 = g



















































B sends the following challenge ciphertext to A:
CT ∗ = (MbT,C1, C2, C3, C4).
Phase II: Same as Phase I.
Guess: A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0.
Analysis: If T = e(gn+1, h), then the simulation is the same as in the real game.
Hence, A will have the probability 1
2
+ ε to guess b correctly. If T is a random
element of GT , then A will have probability 12 to guess b correctly. Therefore, B can
solve the Decision n-BDHE assumption also with advantage ε.
4.4 Comparisons
We give a comparison among in ABBE schemes in Table 4.1 in CP-ABBE and
Table 4.2 in KP-ABBE. The schemes are compared in terms of the order of the
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underlying group, ciphertext size, decryption cost, access struture , and security
assumption. In the table, p denotes the pairing operation, N total attributes in
system, n the number of attributes in access structure, t the number of attributes
in user key,l total number of users , and N << n denotes the maximum number of
wildcards.
We should note that in our CP-ABBE scheme the wildcard positions should be
attached with the ciphertext. A naive way to do this is to include an n-bit string
where a bit “1” indicates wildcard at that position. Similar to the previous works on
BE [BGW05] and ABBE [AI09], this information together with the target receiver
set S are not counted when measuring the ciphertext size in Table 4.1 and Table
4.2.
Table 4.1: Performance Comparison in CP-ABBE
CP-ABBE Ciphertext Size Private Key Size Decryption Cost Access Structure Assumption
[LS08] (n+ l)|G|+ 1|GT | (n+ l)|G| 3p DNF policy GHDE
[AI09] (n+ 2)|G|+ 1|GT | (t+ 2)|G| (2|t ∩ n|+ 3)p LSSS n-BDHE, MEBDH
[JK10] (n+ l)|G|+ 1|GT | (n+ l)|G| (2N + 3)p DNF, CNF policy GHDE
CP-ABBE 4|G|+ 1|GT | (2N + 3)|G| 7p AND Gates + wildcard n-BDHE
(GHDE = General Diffie Hellman Exponent (GDHE) problem)
Table 4.2: Performance Comparison in KP-ABBE
KP-ABBE Ciphertext Size Private Key Size Decryption Cost Access Structure Assumption
[AI09] (n+ 2)|G|+ 1|GT | t|G| (2|t ∩ n|+ 2)p LSSS n-BDHE, MEBDH
KP-ABBE (N + 2)|G|+ 1|GT | 5|G| 7p AND Gates + wildcard n-BDHE
Remark : In Table 4.1 and 4.2 we do not count the wildcard positions when measuring
the ciphertext size. To indicate those wildcard positions, a naive way is to use an
L-bit string, which has the same size as several group elements when L is linear in
the security parameter.
4.5 Summary
We proposed two efficient Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE) schemes
allowing access policies to be expressed using AND-gate with positive, negative, and
wildcard symbols. Our first key policy ABBE scheme achieves constant secret key
size, while the second ciphertext policy ABBE scheme achieves constant ciphertext
size, and both schemes require only constant number of pairing operations in de-




Anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast
Encryption Supporting Multi-Gate Access
Structure
The protection of sensitive resources is essential in public channel, where everybody
can access them without any restriction. By enforcing the access control into the
channel, only the authorized individuals can have permission to access those re-
sources. It is important to integrate into broadcasting systems a fine-grained access
control mechanism, which based on attributes rather than unique identities. Ac-
tually, some distributed systems such as subscription-based channel require both
identity and attributes (age, career, address, etc..), in order to an entity to access
to system. Among all the existing cryptographic tools, Attribute Based Encryption
(ABE) [SW05a, GPSW06, BSW07, CN07, Wat11b, ALP11, LW12] can be used as
an efficient mechanism to specify the access control over encrypted data,and it is
desirable to combine broadcast encryption (BE) [Ber91, FN93] with ABE to produce
a broadcast channel enforcing access policies.
In this work, we address an important problem in ABBE scheme, which is hiding
the access structure including the conjunction of the revoked user set and the access
policy in a ciphetext. Such an ABBE scheme can be deal with the anonymous
recipients when broadcasting in the public channel. One explicit application of our
scheme is Pay TV. Suppose that the manager of Pay TV wants to offer attractive
channels to his customers with ideal prices. The manager does not want to reveal
the identities of registered customers and their access policies such as “(Town A
AND Age > 22) OR (Town C AND Male) ”. The reason is that if the policy is
hidden, the competitive companies can not see and find out the company’s customer
details.
Although a secure ABBE can well protect the secrecy of the encrypted data
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against unauthorised access, it does not protect the privacy of the receivers/decryptors
by default. That is, given the ciphertext, an unauthorised user may still be able to
obtain some information of the data recipients. For example, in our above scenario,
if a CP-ABBE cannot hide the group user and access policy, then from the fact
whether a person can decrypt the message or not, people can directly learn some
sensitive information of the user. Therefore, it is also very important to hide the
access policy in such applications. However, the existing ABBE schemes cannot
achieve this property.
Our contribution.
Simlar to ABE, there are two kinds of ABBE: Key Policy-ABBE and Ciphertext
Policy-ABBE as ABE scheme. We focus on CP-ABBE in this research. We first give
extensive construction to bridge ABBE based on AND-Gate with wildcard with In-
ner Product Encryption (IPE) [KSW08a, SW08, ACP12] named Anonymous AND
Ciphertext Policy-ABBE (A-AND-ABBE). Specifically, we present a way to con-
vert a group revoker user and an access policy containing positive, negative, and
wildcard symbols into a vector ~X which is used for encryption. Next, the user ID
and user’s attributes containing positive and negative symbols are converted into
another vector ~Y which is used in key generation. Apart from ABBE in chapter 4,
we use the positions of different symbols and the Viète’s formulas [SLN+10] to per-
form the conversion. Similar to the A-AND-ABBE, we then construct Anonymous
Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (AABBE) scheme with supporting boolean
gates (AND, OR) with positive, negative attributes named Anonymous OR-AND-
ABBE (A-OR-AND-ABBE). Furthermore, we show how to construct our scheme
with supporting arbitrary OR/AND gates in access structure. Then we apply the
technique of IPE based on the two vectors ~X and ~Y . Due to the attribute-hiding
property of IPE, we achieve the anonymity for our CP-ABBE. An anonymous KP-
ABBE scheme can be constructed in a similar way by snapping the positions of the
two vectors.
5.1 Constructions
5.1.1 Anonymous AND Attribute Based Broadcast Encryp-
tion
We propose a new transformation technique which can deal with hidden revoke user
set in broadcast mechanism and the Viète’s formula to achieve the hidden access
policy in CP-ABBE.
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Idea
Our main idea is to convert the tuple of revoke user set access policy and the tuple
of user ID and user attributes into two vectors, and then apply the technique of
Inner Product Encryption to hide the whole information in the ciphertext.
Firstly, we assume the revoke user set as S = (IDa, IDb, IDc, . . . , IDs) with the
total user set equal to |U |, then apply the Viète’s formula to construct:
IDa + IDb + IDc + . . .+ IDs = a|S|
(IDaIDb + IDaIDc + . . .+ IDaIDs)
. . .+ ID|S|−1IDs = a|S−1|
. . .
IDaIDbIDc . . . IDs = a0
Similar to the first scheme, we separate the positive, negative, and wildcard
symbols in an access structure into three sets: V , Z, and J . Based on the set





coefficients (b0, b1, . . . , b
′
n).














We then produce a vector:
−→v = (a0, a1, . . . , a|S|, . . . , 0|U|, b0, b1, . . . , bn′ , 0n′+1, . . . , 0N1 ,ΠV ,ΠZ)
which will be used for encryption.
In user key generation, each user has a unique ID, we set as the root variant of
polynomial degree U , and we also separate the positive and negative attributes into
two sets and construct two vectors
~xV ′ = (ID



























ik, k = 0, . . . , N1.
Notice that we assume there are at most N1 wildcard positions in an access policy.
The decryption will be based on the inner products of (~v, ~xV ′) and (~v, ~xZ′), which
should both return 0 in order to have a successful decryption.
Below we give a simple example based on Table II to illustrate our idea. Let
U = 3, L = 4, N1 = 2 then S = 2, 3, 5;W2 = (+,−, ∗, ∗) be revoke user set and
the access policy, respectively. Then we create three sets for wildcard positions
J = {3, 4}, positive positions V = {1}, and negative positions Z = {2}. Based on
Viète’s formulas, we can calculate
a0 = −30, a1 = 31, a2 = −10, a3 = 1, b0 = 12; b1 = −7, b2 = 1
and obtain the vector ~v for the access policy and the vectors for Alice with ID = 5
and Bob with ID = 8 as follows.
Figure 5.1: The vector ~v for access policy W2
Figure 5.2: The vector ~z for Alice and Bob
If we calculate the inner product of ~v and the two vectors of Alice, the product
will return 0, i.e., ID of Allice include in S, and Alice’s attributes satisfy the access
policy W2. On the other hand, the inner product of (~v, ~Bobv) = 90 + 8 = 98 and
(~v, ~Bobz) = 90 + 4 = 94, which means Bob’s attributes cannot satisfy W2.
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Construction
Setup(1λ): Assume that we have N attributes in the universe, U set of all user
indices,and each attribute has two possible values: positive and negative. In ad-
dition, we also consider wildcard (meaning “don’t care”) in access structures. Let
N1, N2, N3 be three upper bounds defined as :
N1 ≤ N : the maximum number of wildcard in an access structure;
N2 ≤ N : the maximum number of positive attribute in an attribute set S;
N3 ≤ N : the maximum number of negative attribute in an attribute set S.
The setup algorithm first randomly generates (g,G,GT , p, e) and sets n = |U |+
N1+3. It then chooses randomly γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, {u1,i}ni=1, t1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1, {w1,i}ni=1,
{z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1 in Zp and g2 in G. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp and obtains
{u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2 under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
For i from 1 to n, it creates:
U1,i = g
u1,i , U2,i = g
u2,i ,W1,i = g
w1,i ,W2,i = g
w2,i ,
T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i , Z1,i = g
z1,i ,
V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , V2 = g
θ2 .
Next it sets g1 = g
∆, Y = e(g, g2), and the public key PK and master key MSK as
PK = (g,G,GT , p, e, g1, Y, {U1,i, U2,i, T1,i, T2.i,
W1.i,W2,i, Z1,i, Z2,i}ni=1, {Vi, Xi}2i=1)
MSK = (g2, {u1,i, u2,i, t1,i, t2,i, w1,i, w2,i, z1,i, z2,i}ni=1,
{vi, xi}2i=1).
Encrypt(S,W,M,PK): Given a user index set S = {IDa.IDb, IDc, . . . IDs} ⊆ U
and the access structure W contains: n1 ≤ N1 wildcards which occur at posi-
tions J = {w1, . . . , wn1}; n2 ≤ N2 positive attributes which occur at positions
V = {v1, . . . , vn2}; n3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which occur at positions Z =
{z1, . . . , zn3}. Based on Viète’s formulas, compute for the wildcard positions {wj}
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(j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n1):
IDa + IDb + IDc + . . .+ IDs = a|S|
(IDaIDb + IDaIDc + . . .+ IDaIDs)
. . .+ ID|S|−1IDs = a|S−1|
. . .
IDaIDbIDc . . . IDs = a0.
Then:
bn1 = 1,
bn1−1 = −(w1 + w2 + . . .+ wn1),
bn1−2 = (w1w2 + w1w3 + . . .+ wn1−1wn1),
. . . ,














It creates a vector ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) as:
~v = (a0, a1, . . . , a|S|, . . . , 0|U |, b0, b1, . . . , bn′ , 0n′+1, . . . , 0N1 ,ΠV ,ΠZ).
The encryption algorithm chooses random s1, s2, α, β ∈ Zp and creates the ciphertext
as follows:
Cm = M · Y s2 , CA = gs2 , CB = gs11 ,






















Then ciphertext CT is set as:
CT = (Cm, CA, CB, {C1,i, C2,i, C3,i, C4,i}ni=1).
KeyGen(MSK, ID,L): Suppose that a user joins the system with a given user
identity ID and attribute list L, which contains: n′2 ≤ N2 positive attributes
which occur at positions V ′ = {v′1, . . . , v′n′2}; n
′
3 ≤ N3 negative attributes which
occur at positions Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n′3}. By means of the Viète’s formulas, for all
the positive positions {v′k} (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n′2), for all the negative positions {z′τ}
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ik, k = 0, . . . , N1
It creates vectors −→xV and −→xZ as:
−→xV = ((ID0, ID1, ID2, . . . , ID|U |, v′0, v′1, . . . , v′N1 , 1, 0).
−→xZ = ((ID0, ID1, ID2, . . . , ID|U |, z′0, z′1,+ . . . , z′N1 , 0, 1).
The key generation algorithm chooses randomly ri,1, ri,2 for i = 1 to n, and f1, f2, r1, r2 ∈
Zp, and then creates the secret key as follows:
{K1,i, K2,i} = {g−γ2r1,igf1xViu2,i , gγ1r1,ig−f1xViu1,i},
{K3,i, K4,i} = {g−θ2r2,igf2xZiw2,i , gθ1r2,ig−f2xZiw1,i},















The secret key is set as:
SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1).
Decrypt(SK,CT ): The decryption algorithm returns:
Cm














= e(g, g)r1,is1(−u1,iγ2) · e(g, g)−r1,iviαγ1γ2 · e(g,K1,i)t1,is2








= e(g, g)r1,is1u2,iγ1 · e(g, g)r1,iviαγ1γ2 · e(g,K2,i)t2,is2
·e(g, g)−f1xViu1,iu2,is1 · e(g, g)−f1vixViαγ2u1,i .
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r2,is1∆ · e(g, g)f2vixZiβ∆
·e(g,K3,i)z1,is2e(g,K4,i)z2,is2 .
















e(CA, KA) = e(g

































Therefore, the message M will be returned iff (~v,−→xV ) = 0 and (~v,−→xZ) = 0, meaning
the attributes list in user key SK satisfies the access policy in the ciphertext CT .
* Hidden Policy of Key Policy-ABBE: By using this technique, we can apply
the KP-ABBE with also supporting hidden policy.
5.1.2 Security Proof
Theorem 8 Assume the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and Deci-
sional Linear Assumption hold in group G, then our Anonymous-AND-ABBE scheme
is selective IND-CPA secure and policy hiding.
Since our scheme actually uses the vector corresponding to an access policy to
do the encryption. In order to prove that our scheme is policy hiding, we only need
to prove that the adversary cannot tell which vector, among the two vectors ~v and ~x
corresponding to W0 and W1 respectively, has been used to generate the ciphertext.
In our proof we will consider two cases M0 = M1 and M0 6= M1.
In the caseM0 = M1, we only consider the following game sequence from Game1
to Game5. In this case, we only prove the property of attribute hiding. For the
other case M0 6= M1, we need to consider the whole proof from Game0 to Game6.
72
Chapter 5. Anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption Supporting Multi-Gate Access Structure 73
Below we first give a high level description of each game. In each game, we separate
the vector used to generate (CA, CB, C1,i, C2,i) from the vector for (CA, CB, C3,i, C4,i).
However, the same vector is used for both parts in Game0 and Game6.
Game0 : The challenge ciphertext CT0 is generated under (~v,~v) and M0. The
ciphertext CT0 is computed as follows:























Game1 : The challenge ciphertext CT1 is generated under (~v,~v) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT1 is computed as follows:























Game2 : The challenge ciphertext CT2 is generated under (~v,~0) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT2 is computed as follows:



















Game3 : The challenge ciphertext CT3 is generated under (~v, ~x) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT3 is computed as follows:























Game4 : The challenge ciphertext CT4 is generated under (~0, ~x) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT4 is computed as follows:



















Game5 : The challenge ciphertext CT5 is generated under (~x, ~x) and a random
message R ∈ GT . The ciphertext CT5 is computed as follows:























Game6 : The challenge ciphertext CT6 is generated under (~x, ~x) and message M1 ∈
GT . The ciphertext CT6 is computed as follows:
























Indistinguishability between Game0 and Game1
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can distinguish the two games
with a non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A
73
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to solve the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem also with advantage ε. On
input (g, A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z) ∈ G4, B simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup: B selects random elements γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, λ,
{u1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1, {w1,i}ni=1,
{z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1, in Zp.
Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp to obtain {u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1 under the con-
dition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
Then for i = 1 to n, B sets:
U1,i = g
u1,i , U2,i = g
u2,i , T1,i = (g
b)viγ1gt1,i , T2,i = (g
b)viγ2gt2,i ,
W1,i = g
w1,i ,W2,i = g
w2,i , Z1,i = (g




γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , X2 = g
θ2 , g1 = g
∆, Y = e(ga, gb)−∆ · e(g, g)λ.
Each public key component is distributed properly following the random ex-
ponents:
t1,i = viγ1b+ t1,i, t2,i = viγ2b+ t2,i, z1,i = viθ1b+ z1,i, z2,i = viθ2b+ z2,i,
g2 = g
−ab∆gλ.
• Key Generation Phase 1 & 2: A issues private key queries for the at-
tribute list L. Consider a query with two vectors ~yV = (yV1 , . . . , yVn) and
~yZ = (yZ1 , . . . , yZn). A can request the private key query as long as (−→v ,−→y V ) =
(−→v ,−→y Z) = cy 6= 0.




























which implicitly sets: f1 =
a
2cy
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which implicitly sets: f2 =
a
2cy


















































yVi (u1,it2,i−u2,it1,i) · (K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i .











yZi (w1,iz2,i−w2,iz1,i) · (K ′3,i)−z1,i · (K ′4,i)−z2,i·
Since g2 = g











·(K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i · (K ′3,i)−z1,i · (K ′4,i)−z2,i .
B gives A the private key: SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1) for the
queried vector ~y.
• Challenge Ciphertext: To generate a challenge ciphertext, B picks random
s′1, α
′, β′ ∈ Zp. B implicitly sets:
s1 = s
′
1, s2 = c, α = −bc+ α′, β = −bc+ β′.
Then B sets A = gc = gs2 , B = g∆s1 = gs11 . For i from 1 to n, B computes:
C1,i = (g
u1,i)s1((gb)viγ1gt1,i)cgviγ1(−bc+α


























Next B computes Cm = Z∆ · e(g, gc)λ · M0. If Z = e(g, g)abc the challenge
ciphertext is distributed in Game0, otherwise if Z is randomly chosen in
GT , then the challenge ciphertext is distributed in Game1. Hence, if A can
75
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distinguish these two games, B can solve the DBDH problem.
Indistinguishability between Game1 and Game2
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can distinguish these two games
with non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A to
solve the Decision Linear problem with advantage ε. On input (g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) ∈
G6, B simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup: B selects random elements γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, λ,
{u1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1, {w1,i}ni=1, {z1,i}ni=1,
{z2,i}ni=1 in Zp. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp to obtain {u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2
under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ,∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i,
Then for i = 1 to n, B sets:
U1,i = (g
a)u1,i , U2,i = (g
a)u2,i , T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i ,
W1,i = (g
a)w1,i(gb)θ1vi ,W2,i = (g
a)w2,i(gb)θ2vi , Z1,i = g
z1,i(gb)θ1vi , Z2,i = g
z2,i(gb)θ2vi , .
V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , X2 = g
θ2 , g1 = (g
a)∆, g2 = g
λ.
Each public key component is distributed properly following the random ex-
ponents:
u1,i = au1,i, u2,i = au2,i, w1,i = aw1,i + θ1bvi, w2,i = aw2,i + θ2bvi,
z1,i = viθ1b+ z1,i, z2,i = viθ2b+ z2,i.
• Key Generation Phase 1 & 2: A issues private key queries for the attribute
list L. Consider a query will be created two vectors ~yV = (yV1 , . . . , yVn) and
~yZ = (yZ1 , . . . , yZn) following (5). B picks random exponents {r′1,i}ni=1, {r′2,i}ni=1,












1,ig−f1yViu1,i = g−γ1viyVib ·K ′2,i,












2,ig−f2yZiw1,i = gθ1viyZib ·K ′4,i,
which implicitly sets: r2,i = yZivib+ ar
′
2,i.
Then KB and KA are computed as :
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Since g2 = g









B gives A the private key: SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1, ) for the
queried vector ~y.
• Challenge Ciphertext: To generate a challenge ciphertext, B picks random
s′1, α
′ ∈ Zp. B implicitly sets:
s1 = c, s2 = d, α = α
′.
Then B sets: A = gd = gs2 , B = (gac)∆ = gs11 . For i from 1 to n, B computes:
C1,i = (g
au1,i)c(gd)t1,igviγ1(α












Next B computes for i from 1 to n:
C3,i = (g
aw1,i)c(gd)z1,iZθ1vi , C4,i = (g
aw2,i)c(gd)z2,iZθ2vi .
If Z = gb(c+d)g
r
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If Z = gb(c+d), then B is simulating Game2
C3,i = (g




aw2,i)c(gd)z2,i(gb(c+d))θ2vi = W s12,iZ
s2
2,i.
Therefore, if A can distinguish the two games, B can solve the DLIN problem.
Indistinguishability of Game2 and Game3
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can distinguish these two games
with a non-negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B that uses A to
solve the Decision Linear problem with advantage ε. On input (g, ga, gb, gac, gd, Z) ∈
G6, B simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup: B selects random elements γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, λ, {u1,i}ni=1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1,
{w1,i}ni=1, {z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1, in Zp. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp to obtain
{u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2 under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ,∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
Then for i = 1 to n, B sets:
U1,i = (g
a)u1,i , U2,i = (g
a)u2,i , T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i ,
W1,i = (g
a)w1,i(gb)θ1vi ,W2,i = (g
a)w2,i(gb)θ2vi ,
Z1,i = g
z1,i(gb)θ1vi , Z2,i = g
z2,i(gb)θ2xi , .V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , X2 = g
θ2 ,
g1 = (g
a)∆, g2 = g
λ.
Each public key component is distributed properly following the random ex-
ponents:
u1,i = au1,i, u2,i = au2,i, w1,i = aw1,i + θ1bvi, w2,i = aw2,i + θ2bxi,
z1,i = viθ1b+ z1,i, z2,i = viθ2b+ z2,i.
• Key Generation Phase 1 & 2: A issues private key queries for the attribute
list L. Consider a query will be created two vectors ~yV = (yV1 , . . . , yVn) and
~yZ = (yZ1 , . . . , yZn) following (5). Notice that A obey the restrictions defined
in the model. That is (~v, ~yV ) = (~v, ~yZ) = 0 mod p if and only if (~x, ~yV ) mod p
and (~x, ~yZ) mod p. There are two cases we need to consider.
– Case 1: (~v, ~yV ) = 0 = (~x, ~yZ) mod p. In this case, B picks random
78
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1,i)gf1(yVi )u2,i = gγ2vi(yVi )bg−γ2r
′
1,igf1(yVi )u2,i




1,i)gf1(yVi )u1,i = g−γ1vi(yVi )bgγ2r
′
1,igf1(yVi )u1,i
= g−γ1vi(yVi )b ·K ′2,i,





2,i)gf2(yZi )w2,i = g−θ2xi(yZi )bg−γ2r
′
2,iagf2(yZi )u2,i




2,i)gf2(yZi )w1,i = gθ1xi(yZi )bgθ2ar
′
2,igf2(yZi )w1,i
= gθ1xi(yZi )b ·K ′4,i,
which implicitly sets: r2,i = xiyZib+ ar
′
2,i









































Since g2 = g





−γ2viyVibt1,igγ1viyVibt2,i · (K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i
·g−(xiyZib+ar′2,i)∆g(f2yZiw2,i)(−z1,i−θ1bxi) · g(−f2yZiw1,i)(−z2,i−θ2bxi).
B gives A the private key SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1 for
the queried vector ~y.
– Case 2: (~v, ~yV ) = cv 6= 0 and (~x, ~yZ) = cx 6= 0. In this case, B picks
79
Chapter 5. Anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption Supporting Multi-Gate Access Structure 80














= g−γ1cxviyVib ·K ′2,i,















= gθ1cvxiyZib ·K ′4,i,
which implicitly sets: r2,i = cvxiyZib+ ar
′
2,i, r2









































Since g2 = g





−γ2cxviyVibt1,igγ1cxviyVibt2,i · (K ′1,i)−t1,i · (K ′2,i)−t2,i
·g−(cvxiyZib+ar′2,i)∆g(f2yZiw2,i)(−z1,i−θ1bxi) · g(−f2yZiw1,i)(−z2,i−θ2bxi)
B gives A the private key SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1) for
the queried vector ~y.
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• Challenge Ciphertext: To generate a challenge ciphertext, B picks random
s′1, α
′ ∈ Zp. B implicitly sets:
s1 = c, s2 = d, α = α
′.
Then B sets: A = gd = gs2 , B = (gac)∆ = gs11 . For i from 1 to n, B computes:
C1,i = (g
au1,i)c(gd)t1,igviγ1(α
































Otherwise, if Z = gb(c+d)g
r
for r chosen randomly in Zp, then B is playing
Game3 with A by setting β = r
C3,i = (g




aw2,i)c(gd)z2,i(gb(c+d))θ2vi = W s12,iZ
s2
2,i.
Therefore, if A can distinguish Game2 from Game3, then B can solve the
DLIN problem.
The rest of the proof is similar to the above proofs:
• the indistinguishability between Game3 and Game4 can be proved in the same
way as for Game2 and Game3;
• the indistinguishability between Game4 and Game5 can be proved in the same
way as for Game1 and Game2;
• the indistinguishability of Game5 and Game6 can be proved in the same way
as for Game0 and Game1. 
Theorem 9 Assume the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and Deci-
sional Linear Assumption hold in group G, then our Anonymous OR-AND-ABBE
scheme is selective IND-CPA secure and policy hiding.
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5.1.3 Anonymous OR-AND-ABBE scheme
In this scheme, we consider two values for each attribute. In our construction, we
require an (n+m)−dimensional IPE scheme. We then present the construction for
DNF access structure, since the CNF form can be conversed to the DNF.
Setup(1λ, N, U): Assume that we have N attributes in the universe, U denote the
set of all user indices, and each attribute has two possible values: positive and neg-
ative access structures. Let N2, N3 be three upper bounds defined as :
N2 ≤ N : the maximum number of positive attribute in an attribute set S;
N3 ≤ N : the maximum number of negative attribute in an attribute set S. The
master entity choose a suitable encoding τ1 sending each of the n indices ID ∈ U
onto element τ1(ID) = x1 ∈ Zp, and choose k1, . . . , k2n randomly in Zp.
Next, the setup algorithm randomly generates (g,G,GT , p, e) and sets n = |U |+
|N |. It then chooses randomly γ1, γ2, θ1, θ2, {u1,i}ni=1, t1, {t1,i}ni=1, {t2,i}ni=1, {w1,i}ni=1,
{z1,i}ni=1, {z2,i}ni=1 in Zp and g2 in G. Then it selects a random ∆ ∈ Zp and obtains
{u2,i}ni=1, {w2,i}ni=1, w2, u2 under the condition:
∆ = γ1u2,i − γ2u1,i ∆ = θ1w2,i − θ2w1,i.
For i from 1 to n, it creates:
U1,i = g
u1,i , U2,i = g
u2,i ,W1,i = g
w1,i ,W2,i = g
w2,i ,
T1,i = g
t1,i , T2,i = g
t2,i , Z1,i = g
z1,i ,
V1 = g
γ1 , V2 = g
γ2 , X1 = g
θ1 , V2 = g
θ2 .
Next it sets g1 = g
∆, Y = e(g, g2), and the public key PK and master key MSK as
PK = (g,G,GT , p, e, g1, Y, {U1,i, U2,i, T1,i, T2.i,
W1.i,W2,i, Z1,i, Z2,i}ni=1, {Vi, Xi}2i=1)
MSK = (g2, {u1,i, u2,i, t1,i, t2,i, w1,i, w2,i, z1,i, z2,i}ni=1,
{vi, xi}2i=1).
Encrypt(S,W,M,PK): Given a user index set S = {IDa.IDb, IDc, . . . IDs} ⊆ U
and the access structure W .
The access structure include the revoke user set as S = (IDa, IDb, IDc, . . . , IDs)
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with the total user set equal to |U |, then apply the Viète’s formula to construct:
τ1(IDa) + τ1(IDb) + τ1(IDc) + . . .+ τ1(IDs) = a|S|
(τ1(IDa)τ1(IDb) + τ1(IDa)τ1(IDc) + . . .+ τ1(IDa)τ1(IDs)
. . .+ τ1(ID|S|−1)τ1(IDs) = a|S−1|
. . .
τ1(IDa)τ1(IDb)τ1(IDc) . . . τ1(IDs) = a0
(5.1)
We assume that the access structures can be store m1 ≤ m OR literals as:
W = ((ANDi∈{1,...,m}Ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W1
OR1 (ANDi∈{1,...,m}Ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W2




is computed as follows:
Each AND Gates +/- access structure W is computed as follows:
If








Next apply the Consequence of Viète’s formula to computes the whole access struc-
ture W : 
W1 +W2 + . . .+Wm1 = bm1
W1W2 +W1W3 + . . .+Wm1−1Wm1 = bm1−1
. . .
W1W2 . . .Wm1 = b0
(5.3)
We then produce a vector:
~v = (a0, a1, . . . , a|S|, . . . , 0n, b0, . . . , bm1 , . . . , 0m)
which will be used for encryption.
The encryption algorithm chooses random s1, s2, α, β ∈ Zp and creates the ci-
phertext as follows:
Cm = M · Y s2 , CA = gs2 , CB = gs11 ,























Chapter 5. Anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption Supporting Multi-Gate Access Structure 84
Then ciphertext CT is set as:
CT = (Cm, CA, CB, {C1,i, C2,i, C3,i, C4,i}ni=1).
Key Gen(MSK, ID,L): Suppose that a user joins the system with the a given
user identity ID and attribute list L. Each user joining the system has a unique
ID, τ1(ID) = x0 ∈ Z∗p and an attribute list L.
For an attribute user list L, it computes:
If
atti is + : r′i = kiatti is − : r′i = k2i (5.4)
Then set b′ =
∑
atti∈L












Then, we set as the root variant of polynomial degree U and computes for ID, then
produce a vector:
~z = ((ID0, ID1, ID2, . . . , ID|U |, a′0, a
′




0, . . . , b
′
m)
which will be used for key generation. The key generation algorithm chooses ran-
domly ri,1, ri,2 for i = 1 to n, and f1, f2, r1, r2 ∈ Zp, and then creates the secret key
as follows:
{K1,i, K2,i} = {g−γ2r1,igf1ziu2,i , gγ1r1,ig−f1ziu1,i},
{K3,i, K4,i} = {g−θ2r2,igf2ziw2,i , gθ1r2,ig−f2ziw1,i},















The secret key is set as:
SK = (KA, KB, {K1,i, K2,i, K3,i, K4,i}ni=1).
Decrypt(SK,CT ): The decryption algorithm returns:
Cm
















= e(g, g)r1,is1(−u1,iγ2) · e(g, g)−r1,iviαγ1γ2 · e(g,K1,i)t1,is2








= e(g, g)r1,is1u2,iγ1 · e(g, g)r1,iviαγ1γ2 · e(g,K2,i)t2,is2

















r2,is1∆ · e(g, g)f2vixZiβ∆
·e(g,K3,i)z1,is2e(g,K4,i)z2,is2 .
















e(CA, KA) = e(g




























For the vector ~v = (a0, a1, . . . , a|S|, . . . , 0n, b0, , . . . , bm1 , . . . , bm) corresponding to the
set of user indices S and access structure W in the ciphertext CT and the vector
~z = (ID0, ID1, ID2, . . . , ID|U |, a′0, a
′




0, . . . , b
′
m) corresponding to the secret
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bi−n · b′i−n =
n+m∑
i=n+1
bi−n · b′i−n︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii
Therefore, the message M will be returned if (i) = 0 meaning ID belongs to the
user indices S, and attribute list L in SK satisfies the access policy in the ciphertext
CT , which imply < v, z >= 0
* By using this technique, we can also construct the other inversion scheme,
in which access structure W is associated to the secret key and attributes list L is
embedded to the ciphertext.
Constructions of secret keys: Each AND access structure with positive and









atti∈L′ ki, a user with attribute
list L can decrypt a ciphertext associated with W , where L′ 6|= W and L |= W .
Hence, the assumption holds with overwhelming probability:





= (1− N − 1
p





, where p is the prime number which chosen in the first step, N =
∏2n
i=1 γi. If each
secret key ki is chosen at random from Zp, then our assumption is natural.
5.1.4 Security Proof
Security Analysis: Assume that A announce the ~v = (a0, a1, . . . , a|S|, . . . , 0n, b0,
. . . , bm1 , . . . , bm) by (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) corresponding to the set of user indices S
∗ and
access structure W∗, and B is a simulator, which use A to solve the security problem.
When the adversary A issues private key query for the index ID, and the at-
tribute list L, a query query will be created a vector ~y = (ID0, ID1, ID2, . . . , ID|U |
, a′0, a
′




0, . . . , b
′
m) by (5.4), (5.4) under restriction < v, y >6= 0.














bi−n · b′i−n =
n+m∑
i=n+1
bi−n · b′i−n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii’)
• Case 1: If (i′) = 0 ∧ (i′′) = 0, then < v, y >= 0 holds. B aborts meaning
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ID ∈ S and L |= W∗.
• Case 2: If (i′) 6= 0 ∧ (i′′) 6= 0, then < v, y >= 0 still holds. There exists L




atti∈L′ ki. Therefore, this probability




• Case 3: If (i′) 6= 0 ∧ (i′′) 6= 0, then < v, y > 6= 0 . B gives A the private key
SK for the queried vector ~y
The security proof can be obtained similar as the Anonymous-AND-ABBE
scheme.
5.2 Comparisons
We give a comparison among in CP-ABBE schemes in Table 5.1. The schemes are
compared in terms of the order of the underlying group, ciphertext size, decryption
cost, access structure , and the anonymity. In the table, N - number of clauses in a
policy, M - maximum number of attributes in given clause, k-number of attributes
for given user, r-number of revoked users, kmax - maximum number of attributes
in access policy, n-total of indexed user, m- number of universe attributes, and N1
denotes the maximum number of wildcards.
Table 5.1: Comparisons in CP-ABBE
CP-ABBE Ciphertext Decryption Access Structure Anonymity
[LS08] O(N ·R) O(N.k) DNF policy X
[AI09] O(kmax + r) O(kmax + r) LSSS X
[JK10] O(N ·M) O(M +m) DNF, CNF policy X
[PYSC15] O(1) O(3) AND Gates + wildcard X
A-AND-ABBE O(4r + 4N1 + 2) O(4r + 4N1 + 2) AND Gates +/- with wildcard
√
A-OR-AND-ABBE O(n+m) O(n+m) OR/ AND Gates +/-
√
5.3 Summary
The first scheme HCP-ABBE can even hide the access policy against the legit-
imate decryptors. We proved that our second construction is secure under the
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the Decision Linear assumptions. We then
present Anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption for the OR/AND Gates
positive, negative attribute access policy.
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Chapter 6
Hidden Vector Encryption with Constant
Ciphertext Policy
Embedding policy-based access control into modern encryption schemes is an in-
teresting but challenging task that has been intensively studied by the cryptologic
research community in recent years. Typical examples of such encryption schemes
include Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) [GPSW06, LOS+10, Wat11b, LW12] and
Predicate Encryption [BW07, KSW08a] schemes, which can be treated as special in-
stances of a more general notion called Functional Encryption which was formalized
by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW11].
As a special type of functional encryption, Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE)
schemes [BW07, KSW08a, SLN+10, HHI+11] allow wildcards to appear in either
the encryption attribute vector associated with a ciphertext or the decryption at-
tribute vector associated with a user secret key. Similar to ABE schemes, we name
the former Ciphertext Policy (CP-) HVE schemes and the latter Key Policy (KP-)
HVE schemes. The decryption will work if and only if the two vectors match. That
is, for each position, the two vectors must have the same letter (defined in an al-
phabet Σ) unless a wildcard symbol ‘?’ appears in one of these two vectors at that
position. In this research, we focus on the construction of CP-HVE schemes.
Related Work
All the recent development on functional encryptions can be traced back to the
earlier work on identity-based encryption which was introduced by Shamir [Sha84]
and first realized by Boneh and Franklin [BF01b] and Cocks [Coc01]. One important
extension of IBE is hierarchical IBE (HIBE) [BBG05], which allows users at a level
to issue keys to those on the level below.
The notion of Anonymous IBE was introduced by Boneh et al. [BCOP04b]
and later formalized by Abdalla et al. [ABC+08]. Compared with the normal IBE,
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anonymous IBE supports the additional feature of identity/attribute hiding. That
is, except the user holding the correct decryption key, no one is able to link a
ciphertext with the identity string used to create that ciphertext.
In [ACD+06], Abdalla et al. also proposed another extension of IBE called
Wildcarded IBE (or WIBE for short). WIBE is closely related to CP-HVE except
that the former does not consider the property of identity/attribute hiding when
it was introduced in [ACD+06]. Abdalla et al. proposed several WIBE construc-
tions based on the Waters HIBE [Wat05], the Boneh-Boyen HIBE [BB04], and the
Boneh-Boyen-Goh HIBE [BBG05]. Recently, to address the identity hiding problem,
Abdalla et al. also proposed an anonymous WIBE in [ABC+11].
In a predicate encryption system [BW07, KSW08a] for a (polynomial-time) pred-
icate P , two inputs (besides some public parameters) are required in the encryption
process, one is the message M to be encrypted, and the other one is an index string
i. A decryption key is generated based on a master secret and a key index k. The
decryption key can successfully decrypt a valid encryption of (i,M) if and only if
P (k, i) = 1. IBE can be treated as a special type of predicate encryption where the
predicate function simply performs an equality test, while for HVE the predicate
function will ignore the positions where wildcard symbols ‘?’ have occurred when
doing an equality test.
After the notion of hidden vector encryption was first proposed by Boneh and
Waters in [BW07], several HVE schemes [KSW08a, SW08, IP08, BIP09],
[SLN+10, Par11, HHI+11] have been proposed, most of which are key policy based
(i.e., the wildcards ‘?’ appear in the decryption attribute vector). One common
drawback in many early HVE schemes (e.g. [BW07, KSW08a, IP08, BIP09]) is that
the ciphertext size and the decryption key size are large (linear in the length of the
vector). In [SLN+10], Sedghi et al. proposed an HVE scheme that has constant
decryption key size and short (but still not constant) ciphertext size. In [HHI+11],
Hattori et al. introduced a formal definition for CP-HVE and proposed a CP-HVE
scheme based on the anonymous HIBE proposed in [SKOS09] and the wildcarded
IBE proposed in [ACD+06]. Hattori et al.’s CP-HVE scheme also has a linear ciper-
text size. To the best of our knowledge, there is no HVE scheme proposed in the
literature that can achieve constant size ciphertext.
Our Contributions
We propose two ciphertext policy hidden vector encryption schemes with con-
stant size ciphertext.
• Our first proposed scheme (CP-HVE1) is construct on bilinear groups with
composite order n = pq where p, q are prime numbers. The security of the
scheme is proven in the standard model under three complexity assumptions:
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the Decisional L-composite Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (L-cBDHE) as-
sumption, the L-composite Decisional Diffie Hellman (l-cDDH) assumption,
and the Bilinear Subspace Decision (BSD) assumption.
• Apart from first proposed scheme, we construct our second scheme (CP-HVE2)
built on bilinear groups with prime order. Although, there is a tool to con-
vert from composite order to prime order, we still represent our CP-HVE2
construction more efficient in constant size ciphertext policy compare to using
that tool. Then our second scheme is proven under the Decisional L-Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Exponent (L-BDHE) assumption.
6.1 Definition
6.1.1 Ciphertext-Policy Hidden Vector Encryption
A ciphertext-policy hidden vector encryption (CP-HVE) scheme consists of the fol-
lowing four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
• Setup(1λ,Σ, L): on input a security parameter 1k, an alphabet Σ, a vector-
length L, the algorithm outputs a public key PK and master secret key MSK.
• Encryption(PK,−→v ,M): on input a public key PK, a message M , a vector
~v ∈ Σ∗L where Σ∗ denotes Σ ∪ {∗}, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT .
• KeyGen(MSK,−→x ): on input a master secret key MSK , a vector −→x ∈ ΣL,
the algorithm outputs a decryption key SK.
• Decryption(CT, SK): on input a ciphertext CT and a secret key SK, the
algorithm outputs either a message M or a special symbol ⊥.
6.1.2 Security Model.
The security model for a CP-HVE scheme is defined via the following game between
an adversary A and a challenger B.
• Init: The adversary A chooses two target patterns,
−→
v∗0 = (v0,1, v0,2, . . . , v0,L) and
−→
v∗1 = (v1,1, v1,2, . . . , v1,L)
under the restriction that the wildcards ‘*’ must appears at the same positions.
• Setup: The challenger B run Setup(k,Σ, L) to generate the PK and MSK.
PK is then passed to A.
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• Query Phase 1: A adaptively issues key queries for −→σ = (σ1, . . . , σL) ∈ ΣL
under the restriction that −→σ does not match −→v∗0 or
−→
v∗1 . That is, there exist
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that v∗0,i 6= ∗ ∧ v∗0,i 6= σi, and v∗1,j 6= ∗ ∧ v∗1,j 6= σj. The
challenger runs KeyGen(MSK,−→σ ) and returns the corresponding decryption
key to A.





β) to generate a challenge ciphertext C
∗. B then
passes C∗ to A.
• Query Phase 2: same as Query Phase 1.
• Output: A outputs a bit β′ as her guess for β.
Define the advantage of A as
AdvCP−HVEA (k) = Pr[β
′ = β]− 1/2.
6.2 Construction
6.2.1 CP-HVE Scheme 1
In this section, we present our first CP-HVE under composite order bilinear groups.
Let −→v denote the attribute vector associated with the ciphertext and −→z the at-
tribute vector associated with the user secret key. The expression of these two
vectors is designed based on the idea The Viète’s formulas. To do encryption, we




where J denotes all the








according to the Viète’s formulas. In the decryption process, based on J , the de-









each component of −→z . In this way, whether vi = zi will not affect the decryption if
i ∈ J .
I Setup(1λ,Σ, L): The setup algorithm first chooses N << L where N is the
maximum number of wildcards that are allowed in an encryption vector. It
then picks large primes p, q, generates bilinear groups G,GT of composite order
n = pq, and selects generators gp ∈ Gp, gq ∈ Gq. After that, it selects random
elements:
g, f, v, v′, h1, . . . , hL, h
′
1, . . . , h
′
L, w ∈ Gp,
Rg, Rf , Rv, Rv′ , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Rh′1 , . . . , Rh′L ∈ Gq
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and computes :
G = gRg, F = fRf , V = vRv, V
′ = v′Rv′ ,
H1 = h1Rh1 , . . . , HL = hLRhL ,
H ′1 = h
′





E = e(g, w).
Then it creates the public key and master secret key as:
PK = {gp, gq, G, F, V, V ′, (H1, . . . , HL), (H ′1, . . . , H ′L), E},
MSK = {p, q, g, f, v, v′, (h1, . . . , hL), (h′1, . . . , h′L), w}.
I Encrypt(PK,M,−→v = (v1, . . . , vL) ∈ Σ∗L): Suppose that
−→v contains τ ≤ N
wildcards which occur at positions J = {j1, . . . , jτ}. The encryption algorithm
first chooses:
s ∈R Zn, and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4 ∈R Gq.
Using Viète’s formulas, compute ak for k = 1, 2, · · · , τ , and t = a0. Then set
C0 = M · Es, C1 = G
s






















J = {j1, j2, . . . , jτ},
and ciphertext CT = {C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, J}.
I KeyGen(MSK,−→z = (z1, . . . , zL) ∈ ΣL): The key generation algorithm
chooses r1, r
′
1, r2 randomly in Zn, and computes
K1 = g
r1 , K2 = g






































The secret key is SK = {K1, K2, K3, K4,0, . . . , K4,N}.
I Decrypt(CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first applies the Viète’s formu-
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ji1ji2 . . . jik , 0 ≤ k ≤ τ
and then outputs
M =

























































e(K3, C2) = e(g
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Then we have :




























































r2s ·M · e(g, w)s
e(g, w)s · e(g, f)sr2
= M.
6.2.2 Security Proof
Theorem 10 Our CP-HVE Scheme 1 is secure if the Decisional L−cBDHE as-
sumption, the L− cDDH assumption, and the BSD assumption hold.
We prove Theorem 1 by the following sequence of games.
Game0 : [C0, C1, C2, C3, C4]
Game1 : [C0 ·Rp, C1, C2, C3, C4]
Game2 : [R0, C1, C2, C3, C4]
Game3 : [R0, C1, C2, R3, C4]
Game4 : [R0, C1, C2, R3, R4],
where Rp is a randomly chosen from GT,p, R0 is uniformly distributed in GT , and
R3, R4 are uniformly distributed in G.
We will prove the following Lemmas. Notice that in Game4 the challenge ci-
phertext is independent of the message and the encryption vector, which means the
adversary has no advantage in winning the game over random guess.
Lemma 2 Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for any
PPT adversary, the difference between the advantages in Game0 and Game1 is neg-
ligible.
Lemma 3 Assume that the BSD assumption holds, then for any PPT adversary,
the difference between the advantages in Game1 and Game2 is negligible.
Lemma 4 Assume that the L−cDDH assumption holds, then for any PPT adver-
sary, the difference between the advantages in Game2 and Game3 is negligible.
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Lemma 5 Assume that the L−cDDH assumption holds, then for any PPT adver-
sary, the difference between the advantages in Game3 and Game4 is negligible.
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for any PPT
adversary, the difference between the advantages in Game0 and Game1 is negligible.
We assume that adversary A’s advantage has a difference ε between Game0 and
Game1. The simulator B will use A to solve the Decisional L−cBDHE problem. B is
given a challenge instance Z, T ′ of the problem, where Z = (gp, gq, h, g
α





. . . , gα
2L
p ) and T
′ is either T = e(gp, h)
αL+1 or R ∈R GT,p.
In the rest of the proof, we denote W (−→v ) = {1 ≤ i ≤ L|vi = ∗} and W (−→v ) =
{1 ≤ i ≤ L|vi 6= ∗}, and W (−→v )|kj as {i ∈ W (−→v )|j ≤ i ≤ k}.
• Init: A declares two challenge alphabet vectors −→v∗0 = (v∗0,1, . . . , v∗0,L) and
−→
v∗1 =
(v∗1,1, . . . , v
∗
1,L) under the restriction that W (
−→
v∗0 ) = W (
−→
v∗1 ).
• Setup: In this phase, B generates:
γ, y, y′, ψ, {ui, u′i}i∈|L|
R←− Zn,
Rg, Rf , Rv, Rv′ , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Rh′1 , . . . , Rh′L
R←− Gq.
Then B flips a coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and sets:
G = gpRg, F = g
ψ




















p Rh,i}i∈W (−→v∗µ), {Hi = g
ui
p Rh,i}i∈W (−→v∗µ),
{H ′i = guip Rh′,i}Li=1.
Then the corresponding elements of the master secret key are:
g = gp, f = g
ψ
p , {hi = gui−α
L+1−i
p }i∈W (−→v∗µ), {hi = g
ui


















The master key component w is gα
L+1+αγ
p . Since B does not have g
αL+1
p , B
cannot compute w directly.
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• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for −→σu = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σu) that
does not match the challenge patterns. Let k ∈ W (−→v∗µ) be the smallest integer
such that σk 6= v∗µ,k.



























































































and recall σi = v
∗
µ,i for i ∈ W (
−→
v∗µ)|k−11 and σk 6= v∗µ,k. Hence, we have:







i=1 xiσi + y,
where ∆k = v
∗



































1 · f r2























1 · f r2 .
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−1/∆k · gr̂1p , K2 = g
r′1
p , K3 = g
r2
p .
• Challenge: A sends two messages M0,M1 to B. B generates Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4
R←−




ji1ji2 . . . jik , 0 ≤ k ≤ τ.
Let t = a0. It creates ciphertext as:




























If T ′ = T = e(gp, h)
αL+1 , where h = gcp for some unknown c ∈ Zp, then
C0 = Mb · e(gp, gcp)α
L+1 · e(gαp , gcp)γ = Mb · e(gp, gα
L+1
p )























































t · Z ′4.
Hence, A is in Game0. Otherwise, if T
′ = Rp = e(gp, h)
αL+1 · R′p for some
random R′p ∈ GT,p, then A is in Game1.
• Query Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1.
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• Guess: A output b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1; otherwise B outputs
0.
LetAdvB(k) be the advantage ofB to solve the L−wDBDHI problem, andAdvGame0A (k),
AdvGame1A (k) be the advantages of A in Game0 and Game1. Then we have
AdvB(λ) = |Pr[B → 1|T ′ = T ]− Pr[B → 1|T ′ = Rp]|
= |Pr[B → 1|Game0]− Pr[B → 1|Game1]|
= |(1
2




Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that the BSD assumption holds, then for any PPT adversary, the dif-
ference between the advantages in Game1 and Game2 is negligible.
We assume that adversary A’s advantage has a difference ε between Game1 and
Game2. The simulator B is given a challenge instance Z, T
′ of the BSD problem,
where Z = (gp, gq) and T
′ is either T
R←− GT,p or R
R←− GT . B simulates the game
for A as follows.
• Init: A declares two challenge alphabet vectors.
• Setup: B follows the setup algorithm and creates the public key and master
secret key using gp and gq.
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for −→σ . B simulates the key
generation algorithm honestly by using the master secret key.
• Challenge: A sends to message M0,M1 to B. B flips a coin b
R←− {0, 1} and
returns a normal ciphertext of Mb, with the exception that C0 is multiplied by
T ′. If T ′ = T
R←− GT,p then A is in Game1; otherwise, if T ′ = R
R←− GT , then
A is in Game2.
• Query Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1.
• Guess: A output b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1; otherwise, B outputs
0.
Let AdvB(k) be the advantage of B to solve the BSD problem, and Adv
Game0
A (k),
AdvGame1A (k) be the advantages of A in Game1 and Game2. Then we have
AdvB(k) = |Pr[B → 1|T ′ = T ]− Pr[B → 1|T ′ = R]|
= |Pr[B → 1|Game1]− Pr[B → 1|Game2]|
= |(1
2
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Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that the L−cDDH assumption holds, then for any PPT adversary, the
difference between the advantages in Game2 and Game3 is negligible.
We assume that the adversary A has difference ε in the advantages between
Game2 and Game3. We use A to solve the L−cDDH problem. The simula-
tor B is given a challenge instance Z, T ′ of the L-cDDH problem, where Z =
(gp, gq, h, g
α




p · R1, gα
L+1b
p · R2) and T ′ is either T = gbp · R3 or R ← G.
B simulates the game for A as follows:
• Init: A declares two challenge alphabet vectors −→v∗0 = (v∗0,1, . . . , v∗0,L) and
−→
v∗1 =
(v∗1,1, . . . , v
∗
1,L) under the restriction that W (
−→
v∗0 ) = W (
−→
v∗1 ).
• Setup: In this phase, B generates:




Rg, Rf , Rv̂, Rv′ , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Rh′1 , . . . , Rh′L ∈ Gq.
Then B flips µ ∈ {0, 1} and sets:
G = gpRg, F = g
ψ






































p Rh,i}i∈W (−→v∗µ), {Hi = g
ui
p Rh,i}i∈W (−→v∗µ),
{H ′i = g
u′i−αL+1−i





The corresponding master secret key components are: g = gp, f = g
ψ
p , {hi =
gui−α
L+1−i
p }i∈W (−→v∗µ), {hi = g
ui



























p . The master key com-










Since B does not have gα
L+1
p , B cannot compute v directly.
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for −→σu = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σu) that
does not match the challenge patterns. Let k ∈ W (−→v∗µ) be the smallest integer
such that σk 6= v∗µ,k.
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and recall σi = v
∗
µ,i for i ∈ W (
−→
v∗µ)|k−11 and σk 6= v∗µ,k. Hence,







i=1 uiσi + y,











where ∆k = v
∗
µ,k − σk. B then randomly chooses r1, r̂′1, r2 in Zn, sets r′1 =
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−αkr1
∆k














































1 · f r2 .





































And other elements can also be simulated as follows:
K1 = g
r1






p , K3 = g
r2
p .
• Challenge: A sends two messages M0,M1 to B. Then B generates R0
R←− GT ,
Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4




ji1ji2 . . . jik , 0 ≤ k ≤ τ.
Let t = a0. B creates ciphertext as:
C0 = R0, C1 = T
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If T ′ = gbpg
c
































































































































t · Z ′4.
and CT is in Game2. Otherwise, if T




q for some b







1/t · Z1 = Gb






ψ · Z2 = F b




































































































































t · Z ′′4 ,
where δ = b − b′ is uniformly distributed in Zn for R chosen randomly from
G, and hence CT is in Game3.
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• Query Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1.
• Guess: A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, then B outputs 1; otherwise B
outputs 0.
LetAdvB(k) be the advantage ofB in solving the L−cDDH problem, andAdvGame2A (k),
AdvGame3A (k) be the advantage of A in Game2 and Game3, respectively. Then we
have
AdvB(k) = |Pr[B → 1|T ′ = T ]− Pr[B → 1|T ′ = R]|
= |Pr[B → 1|Game2]− Pr[B → 1|Game3]|
= |(1
2




Proof of Lemma 4
The proof for Lemma 4 is almost the same as that for Lemma 3, except that we
generate V ′ as the role of V in Lemma 3.
Assume that the L−cDDH assumption holds, then for any PPT adversary, the
difference between the advantages in Game3 and Game4 is negligible.
We assume that the adversary A has difference ε in the advantages between
Game2 and Game3. We use A to solve the L−cDDH problem. The simula-
tor B is given a challenge instance Z, T ′ of the L-cDDH problem, where Z =
(gp, gq, h, g
α




p · R1, gα
L+1b
p · R2) and T ′ is either T = gbp · R3 or R ← G.
B simulates the game for A as follows:
• Init: A declares two challenge alphabet vectors −→v∗0 = (v∗0,1, . . . , v∗0,L) and
−→
v∗1 =
(v∗1,1, . . . , v
∗
1,L) under the restriction that W (
−→
v∗0 ) = W (
−→
v∗1 ).
• Setup: In this phase, B generates:




Rg, Rf , Rv̂, Rv′ , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Rh′1 , . . . , Rh′L ∈ Gq.
Then B flips µ ∈ {0, 1} and sets:
G = gpRg, F = g
ψ















V ′ = (gα
L+1























p Rh,i}i∈W (−→v∗µ), {Hi = g
ui
p Rh,i}i∈W (−→v∗µ),
{H ′i = g
u′i−αL+1−i
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The corresponding master secret key components are: g = gp, f = g
ψ
p , {hi =
gui−α
L+1−i
p }i∈W (−→v∗µ), {hi = g
ui

























p . The master key com-










Since B does not have gα
L+1
p , B cannot compute v
′ directly.
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for −→σu = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σu) that
does not match the challenge patterns. Let k ∈ W (−→v∗µ) be the smallest integer
such that σk 6= v∗µ,k.
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and recall σi = v
∗
µ,i for i ∈ W (
−→
v∗µ)|k−11 and σk 6= v∗µ,k. Hence,







i=1 uiσi + y,











where ∆k = v
∗
µ,k − σk. B then randomly chooses r1, r̂1, r2 in Zn, sets r1 =
−αkr′1
∆k















































p )r1 · f r2 .






































And other elements can also be simulated as follows:
K1 = g
r1






p , K3 = g
r2
p .
• Challenge: A sends two messages M0,M1 to B. Then B generates R0
R←− GT ,
Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4




ji1ji2 . . . jik , 0 ≤ k ≤ τ.
Let t = a0. B creates ciphertext as:
C0 = R0, C1 = T
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If T ′ = gbpg
c

































































































































t · Z ′4,
and CT is in Game3. Otherwise, if T




q for some b







1/t · Z1 = Gb






ψ · Z2 = F b





































































































































t · Z ′′4 ,
where δ = b − b′ is uniformly distributed in Zn for R chosen randomly from
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G, and hence CT is in Game4.
• Query Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1.
• Guess: A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, then B outputs 1; otherwise B
outputs 0.
LetAdvB(k) be the advantage ofB in solving the L−cDDH problem, andAdvGame3A (k),
AdvGame4A (k) be the advantage of A in Game3 and Game4, respectively. Then we
have
AdvB(k) = |Pr[B → 1|T ′ = T ]− Pr[B → 1|T ′ = R]|
= |Pr[B → 1|Game3]− Pr[B → 1|Game4]|
= |(1
2




6.2.3 CP-HVE Scheme 2
One straightforward approach to obtain a new CP-HVE scheme under prime-order
bilinear groups is to apply the conversion technique introduced by Lewko [Lew12].
In this section, we present a new prime-order CP-HVE scheme that is more efficient
than the converted scheme.
Setup(1λ,Σ, L): The setup algorithm chooses N << L to be the maximum number
of wildcards that are allowed in an encryption vector. Then it generates other system
parameters including
e : G×G→ GT
L+ 1 random elements V,H1, . . . , HL ∈R G
Then chooses randomly generator g, w, f ∈ G
Y = e(g, w).
The public key and master secret key are set as
PK = (Y, V, (H1, . . . , HL), g, f, p,G,GT , e),
MSK = w.
Encrypt(PK,M,−→v = (v1, . . . , vL) ∈ Σ∗L): Assume that
−→v = (v1, . . . , vL) contains
τ ≤ N wildcards which occur at positions J = {j1, . . . , jτ}. The encryption al-
gorithm chooses s ∈R Zp, and computes using Viete’s formulas t = a0. It then
computes
C0 = MY
s, C1 = g
s
t , C2 = f
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and set the ciphertext CT = (C0, C1, C2, C3, J = {j1, j2, . . . , jτ}).
Key Generation(MSK,−→z = (z1, . . . , zL) ∈ ΣL): given a key vector−→z = (z1, . . . , zL),
the key generation algorithm chooses r, r1 ∈R Zp, then it creates secret key SK as:
K1 = g





















Decrypt(CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first applies the Viete formulas on




ji1ji2 . . . jik , for 0 ≤ k ≤ τ
and then outputs
M =
































e(K2, C2) = e(g
























































































6.2.4 Security Proof of CCP-HVE2
Theorem 11 Assume decision L-BDHE assumption holds in G, then our CP-HVE
Scheme 2 is secure.
Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can attack our scheme with non-
negligible advantage ε, we construct another algorithm B which uses A to solve the
decision L-BDHE problem. On input (g, h,−→y g,α,L = (g1, g2, . . . , gL, gL+2, . . . , g2L), T ),
where gi = g
αi and for some unknown α ∈ Z∗p. The goal of B is to determine whether
T = e(gL+1, h) or not.
In the rest of the proof, we denote W (−→v ) = {1 ≤ i ≤ L|vi = ∗} and W (−→v ) = {1 ≤
i ≤ L|vi 6= ∗}, and W (−→v )|kj as {i ∈ W (−→v )|j ≤ i ≤ k}.
B simulates the game for A as follows:
• Init: A declares two challenge alphabet vectors −→v∗0 ∈ Σ∗L and
−→
v∗1 ∈ Σ∗L under
the restriction that W (
−→
v∗0 ) = W (
−→







2, · · · , v∗L).
• Setup: B chooses N << L, and random values γ, y, ψ, u1, . . . , uL ∈R Zp and
sets
Y = e(gα, gα
L













, {Hi = gui}i∈W (−→v∗µ).
The master key component w is gα
L+1+αγ. Since B does not have gα
L+1
, B
cannot compute w directly.
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for −→σu = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σu) that
does not match the challenge patterns. Let k ∈ W (−→v∗µ) be the smallest integer
such that σk 6= v∗µ,k.
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and recall σi = v
∗
µ,i for i ∈ W (
−→
v∗µ)|k−11 and σk 6= v∗µ,k. Hence, we have







i=1 xiσi + y
where ∆k = v
∗




K3,0 can be represented as
K3,0
= gα
















r̂ · f r1
















r̂ · f r1 .




























Other elements in the key can also be simulated:
K1 = g
r = (gαk)−1/∆k · gr̂, K2 = gr1 .
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ji1ji2 . . . jik , 0 ≤ k ≤ τ.
Let t = a0. It creates ciphertext as:















If T = e(g, h)α
L+1
, the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of Mb. On the
other hand, when T is uniformly distributed in GT , the challenge ciphertext
is independent of b.
• Query Phase 2: Same Phase 1.
• Guess: A output b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0.
If b′ = 0, then the simulation is the same as in the real game. Hence, A will have
the probability 1
2
+ ε to guess b correctly. If b′ = 1, then T is random in G, then
A will have probability 1
2
to guess b correctly. Therefore, B can solve the decision
L-BDHE assumption also with advantage ε.
6.3 Comparison
We give a detailed comparison among all the HVE schemes in Table 6.1. The
schemes are compared in terms of the order of the underlying group, ciphertext
size, decryption cost, and security assumption. In the table, p denotes the pairing
operation, L the length of the vector, and N denotes the maximum number of
wildcards.
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Table 6.1: Performance Comparison
Scheme Group Order Ciphertext Size Decryption Cost Assumption
Katz et al. [KSW08a] pqr (2L+ 1)|G|+ 1|GT | (2L+ 1)p c3DH
Shi–Waters [SW08] pqr (L+ 3)|G|+ 1|GT | (L+ 3)p c3DH
Ivovino–Persiano[IP08] p (2L+ 1)|G|+ 1|GT | (2L+ 1)p DBDH + DLIN
Sedghi et al. [SLN+10] p (N + 3)|G|+ 1|GT | 3p DLIN
cBDH
Lee–Dong [LL11] pqr (L+ 2)|G|+ 1|GT | 4p BSD
c3DH
Park [Par11] p (2L+ 3)|G|+ 1|GT | 5p DBDH+DLIN
L− wDBDHI
Hattori et al. [HHI+11] pq (2L+ 3)|G|+ 1|GT | 3p BSD
L− cDDH
L−cBDHE
CP-HVE1 pq 4|G|+ 1|GT | 4p BSD
L− cDDH
CP-HVE2 p 3|G|+ 1|GT | 3p L-BDHE
6.4 Summary
We proposed two efficient ciphertext policy Hidden Vector Encryption schemes in
this chapter. Both of our encryption schemes can achieve constant ciphertext size,
which forms the major contribution of this work. We proved the security of our




Edit Distance Based Encryption
Measuring the similarity between two strings is an important task in many applica-
tions such as natural language processing, bio-informatics, and data mining. One of
the common similarity metrics that has been widely used in the above applications is
the Edit Distance (a.k.a. Levenshtein distance), which counts the minimum number
of operations (namely, insertion, deletion, and substitution) required to transform
one string into the other. In this chapter, we investigate a challenging problem of
building fuzzy public key encryption schemes based on edit distance.
Our work is motivated by an open problem raised by Sahai and Waters in
[SW05b], where the notion of Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed.
The Fuzzy IBE scheme introduced in [SW05b] can be regarded as the first Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE) scheme with a threshold access policy. To be more precise,
it allows to use a private key corresponding to an identity string I ′ to decrypt a
ciphertext encrypted with another identity string I if and only if the “set overlap”
between I and I ′ (i.e., |I ∩ I ′|) is larger than a pre-defined threshold. One of the
open problems raised in [SW05b] is to construct fuzzy encryption schemes based on
other similarity metrics.
We should note that edit distance is very different from the “set overlap” dis-
tance used in Fuzzy IBE. For example, consider the biometric identity application of
Fuzzy IBE described in [SW05b], given two strings I = “ATCG” and I ′ = “GACT”,
we have |I ∩ I ′| = 4 (i.e., the distance is 0). However, the edit distance between I
and I ′ is 3. It is easy to see that the order of the alphabets in those strings will
affect the edit distance, but not the set overlap distance. This simple example shows
that to a certain extent edit distance provides better accuracy than the set overlap
distance in measuring the similarity of two strings. As another example, given an
encryption string I = “admirer” and a threshold distance d = 1, for edit distance,
we can allow a decryption key associated with I ′ = “admirers” to decrypt the mes-
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sage; while for set overlap distance, we can have some totally unrelated anagrams
of I, such as I ′ = “married”, whose corresponding secret key can also decrypt the
message. Due to the difference between the two distances (or similarity metrics), we
cannot easily extend the technique used in [SW05b] to construct a fuzzy encryption
scheme for edit distance. Also, in order to distinguish our fuzzy encryption scheme
based on edit distance from the Fuzzy IBE proposed in [SW05b], we name our new
encryption scheme Edit Distance based Encryption (or EDE, for short).
Related Work
Since the seminal work of Sahai and Waters [SW05b], many Attribute Based
Encryption (ABE) schemes with the threshold access structure have been proposed
(e.g., [GPSW06, BSW07, HLR10, GZC+12]). In [GPSW06], Goyal et al. extended
the work of Sahai and Waters to construct more expressive Key-Policy (KP) ABE
where the access structure is defined via a tree of threshold gates. Bethencourt et
al. [BSW07] proposed the first Ciphertext-Policy (CP) ABE using the same access
structure. Under the motivation of reducing the ciphertext size, which is linear
in the size of the encryption attribute set in most of the existing ABE schemes,
Herranz et al. [HLR10] proposed a constant-size ABE scheme for the threshold
access structure, which is essentially the same as the set overlap distance metric
used in Fuzzy IBE [SW05b]. In [GZC+12], Ge et al. proposed another constant-size
ABE scheme with the same threshold access structure but under a relatively weaker
assumption.
Another type of fuzzy identity-based encryption is the Wildcarded IBE (or
WIBE for short) proposed by Abdalla et al. [ACD+06, ABC+11, ACP12]. A WIBE
allows wildcard symbols to appear in an identity string used in the encryption pro-
cess, and the wildcard positions will be ignored when measuring the equality of
two identity strings. Another notion that is similar to WIBE is the Hidden Vec-
tor Encryption (HVE) [KSW08b, IP08, SLN+10, Par11, PYS14], which also allows
wildcards to appear in either the encryption string or the key generation string.
However, both WIBE and HVE are based on the fuzzy equality test between two
strings, which is different from the problem we aim to solve in this chapter.
There are also a few works on the privacy-preserving edit distance evaluation
between two strings [AKD03, JKS08, RS10, CKL15, WHZ+15]. These works mainly
focused on finding the edit distance of two (perhaps encrypted) strings in a privacy-
preserving manner, and hence is completely different from this work.
Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of Edit Distance based Encryption
(EDE), formalize its security, and propose a practical scheme in the standard model.
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Edit distance can be measured in polynomial time using different techniques,
such as dynamic programming or recursion. However, in an EDE scheme, the two
strings I and I ′ are embedded in the ciphertext CT and the user secret key SK,
respectively. Hence, the problem becomes how to measure the distance of I and
I ′ using CT and SK. We observe that the most important operation in the edit
distance algorithms is the equality test between two alphabets I[x] and I ′[y]. Based
on this observation, our proposed EDE scheme uses bilinear map [BF01a] to solve
this issue. We illustrate our idea using the following example.
Suppose we have two strings I = “ATTGA” and I ′ = “AGTA”. We first encode
each alphabet as a group element. Then in the encryption process, we create a ran-
domized vector ~I = (As, T s, T s, Gs, As) using the same random number s. Similarly,
we create another randomized vector ~I ′ = (Ar, Gr, T r, Ar) in the key generation pro-
cess. Then we apply bilinear map to conduct equality test between I and I ′ using
the two vectors ~I and ~I ′ which are included in the ciphertext and the secret key re-
spectively. The crux of the idea is illustrated in Figure 7.1. In order to deal with the
threshold problem, we apply the technique of Viète’s formulas [SLN+10] to solve the
problem. In the encryption process, we create a vector ~d = (1, 2, . . . , d, 0, . . . , 0) for
the threshold distance d and embed the vector ~d in the ciphertext. Also, based on the
edit distance d′ between I and I ′, we create another vector ~d′ = (1, 2, . . . , d′, ∗, . . . , ∗)
where ∗ denotes the wildcard (i.e., don’t care) symbol. Then based on ~d and ~d′, we
ensure that the decryption can be successful if and only if d′ ≤ d. Also, we over-
come the issue of malleability by using the composite order group in constructing
the EDE scheme. We prove that our proposed scheme is selectively secure under
the L-composite Decisional Diffie-Hellman (L-cDDH) assumption.
Figure 7.1: Edit Distance Evaluation using Bilinear Map
We also show an interesting application of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broad-
cast Encryption (FBE), which is very useful in broadcasting networks. An FBE
scheme allows the encryptor (i.e., message sender) to specify a set of receiver iden-
tities during the encryption process, and a user can decrypt the message if and only
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if the minimum edit distance between his/her identity and all the identities chosen
by the encryptor is below a threshold that is also specified by the encryptor during
the encryption process.
7.1 Definition
7.1.1 Edit Distance Based Encryption Definition
An Edit Distance Based Encryption (EDE) scheme consists of the following four
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
• Setup(1λ,Σ): on input a security parameter 1n, an alphabet Σ, the algorithm
outputs a public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
• Encrypt(PK,−→v ,M, d): on input a public key PK, a message M , a vector
−→v ∈ Σn and a distance d, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT .
• KeyGen(MSK,−→x ): on input a master secret key MSK, a vector −→x ∈ Σm,
the algorithm outputs a decryption key SK.
• Decrypt(CT, SK): on input a ciphertext CT and a secret key SK, the algo-
rithm outputs either a message M if EditDistance(−→v ,−→x ) ≤ d, or a special
symbol ⊥.
7.1.2 Security Model of EDE scheme
The security model for an EDE scheme is defined via the following game between
an adversary A and a challenger B.
• Setup: The challenger B run Setup(1n,Σ) to generate the PK and MSK.
PK is then passed to A.
• Query Phase 1: The challenger answers all private key queries for a vector
−→σ by returning : skσ ← KeyGen(MSK,−→σ ).
• Challenge: A submits two equal-length messages M0 and M1, a target vector
−→v ∗ ∈ Σn and threshold τ such that EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→σ ) > τ for any vector
−→σ that has been queried in Phase 1. The challenger then flips a coin β ← {0, 1}
and computes the challenge ciphertext C∗ ← Encrypt(PK,−→v ∗,Mβ, τ), which
is given to A.
• Query Phase 2: same as Query Phase 1 except that EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→σ ) >
τ for any vector σ queried in this phase.
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• Output: A outputs a bit β′ as her guess for β.
Define the advantage of A asAdvEDEA (k) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2|.
Selective Security. In the selective security model, the adversary A is required
to submit the target vector −→v ∗ ∈ Σn and threshold τ before the game setup,
and A is only allowed to make private key queries for any vector −→σ that satisfies
EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→σ ) > τ throughout the game.
7.2 Construction
7.2.1 Edit Distance based Encryption
In this section, we introduce our EDE scheme, which is based on the Dynamic Pro-
gramming [Gus97] algorithm for calculating edit distance.
Setup(1λ,Σ): The setup algorithm first chooses L = poly(n) as the maximum
number of length of a word that would appear in the encryption and key generation.
It then picks large primes p, q, generates bilinear groups G,GT of composite order
n = pq, and selects generators gp ∈ Gp, gq ∈ Gq. After that, generate:
v0, v
′
0, b0, g, f, ω, h1, . . . , hL, u1, . . . , uL ∈R Gp, x1, . . . , xL, x′1, . . . , x′L ∈R Zn,
v1 = v
x1







x1 , . . . , v′L = (v
′
0)
xL , b1 = b
x′1
0 , . . . , bL = b
x′L
0 ,
Rg, Rf , Rv0 , . . . , RvL , Rv′0 , . . . , Rv′L ,
Rb0 , . . . , RbL , Rh1 , . . . , RhL , Ru1 , . . . , RuL ∈ Gq,
G = gRg, F = fRf , Y = e(g, ω),








LRv′L , B0 = b0Rb0 , . . . ,
BL = bLRbL , H1 = h1Rh1 , . . . , HL = hLRhL , U1 = u1Ru1 , . . . , UL = uLRuL ,
and set the public key and secret key as:
PK = {Y,G, F, (V0, . . . , VL), (V ′0 , . . . , V ′L), (B0, . . . , BL), (H1, . . . , HL), (U1, . . . , UL)},
MSK = {g, f, ω, (v0, . . . , vL), (v′0, . . . , v′L), (b0, . . . , bL), (h1, . . . , hL), (u1, . . . , uL)}.
Encrypt(PK,−→v = (v1, . . . , vn1) ∈ Σn1 ,M, d): On input the public key PK, a
vector −→v = (v1, . . . , vn1) with n1 ≤ L, it first generates for each alphabet vi a
vector ~xi = (vi, 1, . . . , 1L), and expands
−→v to −→v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn1 , . . . , 1L) and sets−→
d = (1, . . . , d, 0d+1, . . . , 0L). Then choose s ∈R Zn, and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4,
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Z5 ∈R Gq, and compute:
C0 = MY
s, C1 = G
sZ1, C2 = F


























Set the ciphertext as: CT = (n1, C0, C1, C2, {C3,i}n1i=1, C4, {{C5,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0).
KeyGen(MSK,−→z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ Σm): Given a key vector −→z = (z1, . . . ,
zm), it generates ~yi = (zi, 1, . . . , 1L) for each alphabet zi, and creates
−→σ = (1, 2, ..., L)
and expands −→z to −→z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm, . . . , 1L). Then choose r1, r2 ∈R Zn, and
compute:
K1 = g
r1 , K2 = g

























































































, (t = 1, . . . , L).
Then set the user secret key as SK = (m,K1, K2, {K3,i}mi=1, {{K4,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0).
Decrypt(CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first executes the dynamic program-
ming algorithm for edit distance by following Algorithm 1 which returns a distance
d′ = cost[lenv − 1], the matching indices array pos[0][] for −→v and pos[1][] for −→z . It
sets τ = L− d′, and applies the Viète’s formulas to compute
• for the index set Ωv = {L\{pos[0][0], . . . , pos[0][d′ − 1]}} = {ω1, . . . , ωL−d′},
then aτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ωi1ωi2 . . . ωik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ),
• for the index set Ωz = {L\{pos[1][0], . . . , pos[1][d′ − 1]}} = {ω̄1, . . . , ω̄L−d′},
then āτ−k = (−1)k
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<ik≤τ
ω̄i1ω̄i2 . . . ω̄ik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ),
• for the threshold index set J = {j1, . . . , jτ} with j1 = d′ + 1, . . . , jτ = L, then
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ji1ji2 . . . jik (0 ≤ k ≤ τ).
Algorithm 1: Edit distance evaluation via dynamic programming
input : CT, SK
output: d′, pos
lenv = n+ 1; lenz = m+ 1;
Creat cost[lenv]; Creat newcost[lenv]; Creat pos[2][];
//setup two arrays to store the position matching pos[0][] for vector v,
pos[1][] for vector z ;




for j ← 1 to lenz do
newcost[0] = j;
for i← 1 to lenv do
// matching current letters in both strings
match = (e(K2, C3,i−1) == e(C1, K3,j−1))?0 : 1;
// store the i match in array pos[0], j match in array pos[1]
if i /∈ pos[0], j /∈ pos[1] then
pos[0][k + +] = i, pos[1][k + +] = j, ;
end
// computing cost for each transformation
replace = cost[i− 1] +match; insert = cost[i] + 1; delete =
newcost[i− 1] + 1;
// keep minimum cost
newcost[i] =
Math.min(Math.min(cost− insert, cost− delete), cost− replace);
end
// swap cost-newcost arrays
swap[] = cost; cost = newcost;newcost = swap;
end
// return the cost for transforming all letters in both strings and array list
pos including pos[0], pos[1]
return cost[lenv − 1], pos;
Then recover M as:
M =
























































We then illustrate an example:
Input: “AAGTA”, “AAAGG”
Output:
− d′ = 2
− pos =< pos[0][], pos[1][] >, with pos[0][] = {1, 2}, pos[1][] = {1, 2}
In message recovery:
C0 = M · e(g, ω)s
e(K2, C4) = e(g











e(K1, C2) = e(g
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Theorem 12 Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for
any PPT adversary, our EDE scheme is selectively secure.
Let B denote the algorithm to solve the Decisional L−cBDHE problem. B is given
a challenge instance Z, T ′ of the problem, where Z = (gp, gq, h, g
α





p , . . . , g
α2L
p ) and T
′ is either T = e(gp, h)
αL+1 or R ∈R GT,p. B simulates the
game for A as follows:
• Init: A submits a target vector −→v ∗ ∈ Σn, and target threshold τ . Let
−→
d =
(1, . . . , τ, τ + 1, . . . , L) denote a vector of length L. We denote ind(
−→
d ) =
{1 ≤ i ≤ L|di = 0} and ind(
−→





d )|j ≤ i ≤ φ}.
• Setup: In this phase, B generates:
γ, ψ, v0, v
′
0, b0, g, f, h
′




1, . . . , u
′
L ∈R Gp, x1, . . . , xL, x′1, . . . , x′L ∈R Zn,
v1 = v
x1







x1 , . . . , v′L = (v
′
0)
xL , b1 = b
x′1
0 , . . . , bL = b
x′L
0 ,
Ry, Rg, Rf , Rv0 , . . . , RvL , Rv′0 , . . . , Rv′L , Rb0 , . . . , RbL , Rh′1 , . . . , Rh′L , Ru′1 , . . . ,
Ru′L ∈R Gq,
G = gpRg, F = g
ψ
























p Rbk , with k = 1, . . . , L,
Hi = g
h′i
p Rhi , {Ui = g
u′i−αL+1−i
p Ru′i}i∈ind(−→d ), {Ui = g
u′i
p Ru′i}i∈ind(−→d )
The corresponding master secret key components are: g = gp, f = g
ψ
p , hi =
g
h′i
p , {ui = g
u′i−αL+1−i
p }i∈ind(−→d ), {ui = g
u′i

















p , with k = 1, . . . , L. Notice that
the master key component ω is gα
L+1+αγ
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cannot compute ω directly.
• Query Phase 1: A queries the user secret key for a string−→z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm)
under the constraint that EditDistance(−→v ∗,−→z ) > τ . Assume EditDistance(−→v ∗,
−→z ) = σ and denote −→σ = (1, 2, . . . , σ, 0, . . . , 0) and
−→
d = (1, 2, . . . , τ, 0, . . . , 0).
Note that since σ > τ , there exists at least one position i such that di = 0 and
σi 6= 0. Let φ ∈ ind(
−→
d ) be the smallest integer such that σφ 6= dφ.






























































































recall σi = di for i ∈ ind(
−→
















where ∆φ = (dφ − σφ). Then we choose r̂, r′2 randomly in Zn, and set r1 =
−αφ
∆φ
+ r′1, r2 = r
′
2.
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Next, it generates for each alphabet in −→z :

~y1 = (z1, 1, . . . , 1L)
. . . ,
~ym = (zm, 1, . . . , 1L)
, then






r′2 . Other elements in the key can also be simu-




+r′1 , K2 = g
r′2 .
• Challenge: A sends two messages M0,M1 to B. The challenger then flips a
coin β ← {0, 1}.
First, B generates for each alphabet in −→v ∗:

~x∗1 = (v1, 1, . . . , 1L)
. . . ,
~x∗m = (vm, 1, . . . , 1L)
, then
generates Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5
R←− Gq and sets:






























where h = gcp for some unknown c ∈ Zp. B returns the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ = (n1, C1, C2, {C3,i}n1i=1, C4, {{C5,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0)
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to A. If T ′ = T = e(gp, h)
αL+1, then:
C0 = Mb · e(gp, gcp)α
L+1 · e(gαp , gcp)γ = Mb · e(gp, gα
L+1
p )
c · e(gαp , gγp )c = Mb · Y c
C1 = (g
c


























































































))c · Z ′5.
The challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of Mb. On the other hand, when
T ′ is uniformly distributed in GT,p, the challenge ciphertext is independent of b.
• Query Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
• Guess: A output b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b then B outputs 1; otherwise outputs 0.
If b′ = 0, then the simulation is the same as in the real game. Hence, A will have
the probability 1
2
+ ε to guess b correctly. If b′ = 1, then T ′ is random in GT,p, then
A will have probability 1
2
to guess b correctly.
Therefore, B can solve the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption also with advantage
ε. 
7.4 EDE Application-Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption
We demonstrate an extension of the proposed EDE scheme to achieve Fuzzy Broad-
cast Encryption. To illustrate how the scheme works, let’s consider the following ex-
ample. Suppose we encrypt a message under a keyword vector W = {Labour Party,
Defence Unit} and a threshold distance d = 2. Subsequently, people who have the
attributes related to the keyword w = Labor Party or w′ = Defense Unit can decrypt
the message since the minimum edit distance between w (w′, respectively) and all
the keywords in W is 1, which is less than the threshold d = 2.
124
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7.4.1 Definition
A Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption (FBE) scheme consists of the following four proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
• Setup(1λ,Σ): on input a security parameter 1n, an alphabet Σ, the algorithm
outputs a public key PK and the corresponding master secret key MSK.
• Encrypt(PK,M,W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk,lk) ∈ Σn1 , d): on input a public key
PK, a list of k keywords W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk,lk) in which each keyword
wi,li has li characters, and a threshold distance d, the algorithm outputs a
ciphertext CT .
• Key Gen(MSK,w ∈ Σm): on input the master secret key MSK and a
keyword w of length m, the algorithm outputs a secret key SKw.
• Decrypt(CT, SKw): on input a ciphertext CT with keywords W = (w1,l1 ,
w2,l2 , . . . , wk,lk) and a secret key SKw with keyword w, the algorithm outputs
M if Min{EditDistance(wi,li , w)}ki=1 ≤ d, or ⊥ otherwise.
7.4.2 Construction
Below we present a FBE scheme based on our EDE scheme.
Setup(1λ,Σ): The setup algorithm is generated similar to the original EDE scheme.
Encrypt(PK,W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk′,lk′ ),M, d): On input the public key PK, a
list of k keywords W = (w1,l1 , w2,l2 , . . . , wk′,lk′ ) in which each keyword wi,li has li
alphabets, it first generates for each alphabet wi,j in keyword wi,li a vector
~x11 = (w11, 1, . . . , 1L), . . . , ~x1l1 = (w1l1 , 1, . . . , 1L),
. . .
~xk′1 = (wk′1, 1, . . . , 1L), . . . , ~xk′l′k = (wk′lk′ , 1, . . . , 1L).
Define 
~w1 = (w11, w1,2, . . . , w1,l1 , . . . , 1L),
. . . ,
~wk′ = (wk′1, wk′2, . . . , wk′,lk′ , . . . , 1L),
and
−→
d = (1, . . . , d, 0d+1, . . . , 0L). Then choose s ∈R Zn, and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4,
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Z5 ∈R Gq, and compute:
C0 = MY
s, C1 = G
sZ1, C2 = F


























Set the ciphertext as: CT = ({lδ}k
′










KeyGen(MSK, w̄ = (w̄1, . . . , w̄m) ∈ Σm): given a keyword w̄ of length m, it
generates ~yi = (w̄i, 1, . . . , 1L) for each alphabet w̄i, and creates
−→σ = (1, 2, ..., L) and
expands w̄ to w̄ = (z1, z2, . . . , zm, . . . , 1L). Then choose r1, r2 ∈R Zn, and compute:
K1 = g
r1 , K2 = g

























































































, for t = 1, . . . , L. Then set the secret key as SK = (m,K1, K2, {K3,i}mi=1,
{{K4,k,t}Lk=0}Lt=0).
Decrypt(CT, SK): The decryption algorithm first executes the dynamic program-
ming algorithm for edit distance by following Algorithm 2 which returns a mini-
mum distance d′, the index posw of the corresponding keyword w in W , the matching
indices array pos[0][] for w and pos[1][] for w̄. It sets τ = L − d′, and applies the
Viète’s formulas to compute
We then set aτ−k, āτ−k, âτ−k similar to (3), (4), (5).
Then recover M as:
M =
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Algorithm 2: Multi-keyword Edit Distance Evaluation via Dynamic Pro-
gramming
input : CT, SK
output: distance d′, index posw, array pos[2][]
Create Array[len(W )]; Create pos[2][]; Create Array < pos > aPos;
for θ ← 1 to len(W ) do
lenv = nθ + 1; lenz = m+ 1;
Creat cost[lenv]; Creat newcost[lenv];




for j ← 1 to lenz do
newcost[0] = j;
for i← 1 to lenv do
match = (e(K1, C3,θ,i−1) == e(C1, K3,j−1))?0 : 1;
if i /∈ pos[0], j /∈ pos[1] then
pos[0][k + +] = i, pos[1][k + +] = j, ;
end
aPos.add(pos);
cost− replace = cost[i− 1] +match; cost− insert =
cost[i] + 1; cost− delete = newcost[i− 1] + 1;
newcost[i] = Math.min(Math.min(cost− insert, cost−
delete), cost− replace);
end
swap[] = cost; cost = newcost;newcost = swap;
end
Array[t+ +] = cost[lenv − 1];Refresh pos;
end
return Min(Array[]), posw = index[Array[i] == Min(Array[])], pos =
aPos[posw];
Theorem 13 Assume that the Decisional L−cBDHE assumption holds, then for
any PPT adversary, our FBE scheme is selectively secure.
We give the security definition in the full version since the limited space. The
security proof follows that of Theorem 1.
7.5 Summary
We introduced a new type of fuzzy public key encryption in this chapter. Our new
encryption scheme, called Edit Distance-based Encryption (EDE), allows a user
associated with an identity or attribute string to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted
under another string if and only if the edit distance between the two strings are
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within a threshold specified by the encrypter. We provide the formal definition,
security model, and a concrete EDE scheme in the standard model. We also showed




8.1 Summary of our contributions
We briefly summarize our main contributions as each following subsections.
8.1.1 Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
We propose two new Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE)
schemes where the access policy is defined by AND-Gate with wildcard. In the
first scheme, we present a new technique which uses only one group element to
represent an attribute, while the existing ABE schemes of the same type need to
use three different group elements to represent an attribute for the three possible
values (namely positive, negative, and wildcard). Our new technique leads to a
new CP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext size, which however cannot hide the
access policy used for encryption. The second scheme of this work is to propose
a new CP-ABE scheme with the property of hidden access policy named Hidden
Ciphertext Policy-ABE by extending the technique we used in the construction of
our first scheme.
8.1.2 Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
We proposed two ABBE schemes including KP-ABBE and CP-ABBE schemes. We
achieve short ciphertext size for CP-ABBE and short key size for KP-ABBE , which
forms the major contribution of this work.
8.1.3 Anonymous Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
We presented two new constructions of Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption for
the OR/AND Gate and AND Gate with wildcard access policies. We solved the
129
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interesting problem of providing the anonymity in ABBE scheme.
8.1.4 Efficient Ciphertext Hidden Vector Encryption
We introduce two constant size ciphertext policy hidden vector encryption (CP-
HVE) schemes. Our first scheme is constructed on composite order bilinear groups,
while the second one is built on bilinear groups with prime order. Both schemes are
proven secure in a selective security model which captures plaintext (or payload)
and attribute hiding.
8.1.5 Edit Distance Based Encryption
We introduce a new type of fuzzy public key encryption called Edit Distance-based
Encryption (EDE). In EDE, the encryptor can specify an alphabet string and a
threshold when encrypting a message, and a decryptor can obtain a decryption key
generated from another alphabet string, and the decryption will be successful if and
only if the edit distance between the two strings is within the pre-defined threshold.
We provide a formal definition and security model for EDE, and propose an EDE
scheme that can securely evaluate the edit distance between two strings embed-
ded in the ciphertext and the secret key. We also show an interesting application
of our EDE scheme named Fuzzy Broadcast Encryption which is very useful in a
broadcasting network.
8.2 Future Work
• For our proposed Hidden Ciphertext Policy-ABE, one shortcoming is that
its ciphertext size is no longer constant. It is an interesting future work to
construct a hidden ciphertext policy-ABE with constant ciphertext.
• The ABBE scheme which achieves the short ciphertext and decryption key
can be extended to achieve adaptive security.
• Another interesting problem is the construction of an anonymous EDE scheme,
which implies a Fuzzy Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search scheme to
preserve the privacy of the keyword.
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